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SEX OFFENDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
ERSONS who are convicted of sex offenses' involving children 2
are among the most reviled members of society.3 The offenses
these persons commit are profoundly tragic in several respects. 4
Children are the most vulnerable of victims, suffering traumatic and fre-
quently life-long physical and emotional damage. 5 Many of these child
victims may themselves subsequently commit sex offenses against chil-
dren, compounding the perniciousness of such offenses.6 Aside from the
horror of victimizing children, sex offenders who have paraphilic disor-
ders such as pedophilia-defined as socially reprobative sexual desires for
or sexual behavior involving children by an adult 7-often have many vic-
1. The definition of the term "sex offense" varies by jurisdiction; here, the term is
intended broadly, and is meant to include any criminally chargeable act that involves con-
duct of a sexual nature. Such conduct may include, for example, homosexual conduct,
lewdness, indecency, sexual battery, distribution of sexually oriented material to children,
and sodomy. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.06-08 & 11 (Vernon 1996) (providing
as sexual offenses homosexual conduct, where a person engages in deviate sexual inter-
course; public lewdness; indecent exposure; and indecency with a child); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 290(n)(1)(B), 286.5, 288(a), 288a, & 289 (West 1996) (defining sexual offenses
under these sections as, for example, penetration against the person's will of another's
genital or anal opening by a foreign object for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratifica-
tion; oral copulation between the mouth of one person and the sexual organ or anus of
another person; sexual assault on an animal for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the
sexual desire of the person; lewd or lascivious acts involving children under age 14 with the
intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions or sexual desires of that
person or the child); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-5-23, 97-5-27, & 97-3-95 (West 1996) (defining
sex offenses as, for example, the touching of a child for lustful purposes, disseminating
sexually oriented material to children, and sexual battery); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.20(3),
130.50 (McKinney 1997) (including as a sex offense any sexual conduct with an animal or a
dead human body, and sodomy). Thus, persons convicted of such offenses are referred to
as "sex offenders." See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-102(2) (West 1996).
2. The definition of "children" or "child" under criminal statutes also varies by juris-
diction and is generally limited by chronological age. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.11 (Vernon 1996) (defining child under this section as a person younger than 17
years). Where relevant for purposes of this paper, the terms children or child will be ex-
plained either in text or citation.
3. See, e.g., Child Molester Killed by Inmates, COM. APPEAL, Oct. 19, 1996, at B2;
Doug Nurse, Station Denies Tie of Show to Killing, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Oct. 3, 1996, at 1
(reporting killing of Donald Glenn McDougall-who was convicted of the torture-slaying
of a five-year-old girl by prison inmates shortly after a radio show aired details of the case
and after other inmates indicated to prison officials that McDougall's life was in danger);
Larry D. Hatfield, No Special Treatment for Convicted Child-Killer Davis, Warden Says,
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Sept. 29, 1996, at A13 (reporting that "child molesters are at
the bottom of a prison's respect hierarchy").
4. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 527-28 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-
IV]. See also STEDMAN'S CONCISE MEDICAL DICTIONARY 751, 759 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinaf-
ter STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY]. Using this definition of pedophilia, it is clear that
not all sex offenders whose victims are children are pedophiles. Some offenders may not
be drawn like pedophiles to children at all, but may instead victimize children inadver-
tently, such as under an intoxicated state, impaired mental state, or mistaken belief. Dis-
tinguishing between pedophile and non-pedophile sex offenders is important because the
possible treatment alternatives for each may be markedly different. See infra Part II.A.1.
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tims, sometimes numbering into hundreds over a lifetime of offending.8
Finally, pedophilic sex offenders frequently continue to commit sex of-
fenses after incarceration, even after receiving treatment for the
pedophilic disorder.9 Given the inarguably tragic consequences of sex of-
fenses involving child victims, the sensationalism generated by several
cases, 10 and an increase in reported sex offense cases involving children,"
the public hue and cry is not surprising.12 What is remarkable, however,
are some of the means enacted or proposed by public officials to deal
with such sex offenders. One touted method is to permit-and perhaps
implicitly encourage-surgical castration, also called "orchiectomy," of
incarcerated sex offenders whose victims were children. 13 Some propo-
Not all adults who have paraphilias involving children are classified as pedophiles. WIL-
LIAM E. PRENDERGAST, TREATING SEX OFFENDERS IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND
OUTPATIENT CLINICS: A GUIDE TO CLINICAL PRACTICE 137 (1991). Those whose sexual
interests involve post-pubertal children are called "hebophiles." See id. at 140. Hebophiles
are quite distinct from pedophiles, with important implications for treatment. See id. at
141-42; see also infra note 25.
8. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
9. See generally Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A
Meta-Analysis of Recent Treatment Studies, J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 802,
805-07 (1995) (reviewing 12 published studies between 1988 and 1992, and finding through
a meta-analysis of the studies that 19% of the study participants committed additional
sexual offenses following completion of treatment).
10. See generally PHILIP JENKINS, PEDOPHILES AND PRIESTS: ANATOMY OF A CONTEM-
PORARY CRISIS 33-76 (1996) (chronicling and reviewing some of the 31 mass media reports
of "sexual misbehavior" by priests); see also George Flynn, Sex Abuse Lawsuit Accuses
HISD and Former Teacher, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 11, 1997, at 15A, available in 1997 WL
6544772 (reporting on a 10 million dollar lawsuit filed against a local school board district
after one of its former teachers-found liable for 45.5 million dollars in damages in a previ-
ous child sexual abuse case, believed to be the largest verdict ever against a teacher in a
molestation case, was subsequently charged with abusing a second student).
11. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
12. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, A Figure of Infamy is Held in a Second Outrage, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at A10 (reporting that Lawrence Singleton, who was convicted in
1979 for the rape and axmutilation of a 15-year-old girl and whose crime led to tougher
sentencing in many states, was now charged with the murder of a woman); Marlise Simons,
Sex Slayings Alarm France on Peril of Repeat Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at A6
(reporting that the rapes and slayings of four women, two of whom were 17 years old, sent
thousands of protesters into the streets screaming, "[b]ring back the death penalty," and
that these recent crimes together with similar crimes in the U.S. and other western coun-
tries raise perplexing questions on how to deal with sex offenders).
13. See S.B. 123, 75th Legis. Sess. (Tex. 1997) (a bill entitled An Act Relating to the
Treatment of Repeat Sex Offenders); A.B. 3339, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 1996) (hereinafter
CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL 3339). The California law repeals and adds § 6445 of the state's
penal code. See id. § 1. The California law also provides that a judge may impose-upon
any person guilty of a first offense of any one of several sex offenses involving children-
treatment involving the use of MPA, an antiandrogenic compound drug believed to lower
testosterone levels and therefore reduce sexual drive and aggression. See id. § 2; see also
A. Kenneth Fuller, Child Molestation and Pedophilia: An Overview for the Physician,
261(4) JAMA 602, 604 (1989) (reviewing the various treatments available for paraphilic
syndromes such as pedophilia). The judge must impose such treatment upon persons
twice-convicted for such offenses. See CAL. ASSEMBLY BILL 3339 § 2. However, no person
will be subject to such treatment if the "person voluntarily undergoes a permanent, surgical
alternative .... " Id.
For purposes of this Article, surgical castration, or bilateral orchiectomy, involves the
removal of a man's testes. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 164,
721. The term surgical castration also includes bilateral oophorectomy, or the removal of a
[Vol. 51
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nents of surgical castration argue that orchiectomies may be an appropri-
ate clinical response for certain repeat sex offenders and should therefore
be made available to such offenders. 14 These proponents point to evi-
dence that essentially shows that surgical castration is a minimally inva-
sive, efficacious and long-lasting clinical intervention that reduces a
pedophile's urge to recidivate.15 Other proponents suggest that surgical
castration is a justifiable penological response to intractable criminal be-
havior.16 These proponents find that surgical castration is a deserving
punishment for sex offenders, and some even suggest that a death sen-
tence may be more appropriate.1 7 Opponents of surgical castration ob-
ject for several reasons, citing, for example, the lack of sufficient research
that establishes the procedure's effectiveness, the procedure's barbarity,
its potential for abuse, and the multifactorial etiology of sexual deviance
for which castration may be an inadequate or inappropriate response.' 8
woman's ovaries, though this is not the subject of this Article. See id. at 164, 715; BENJA-
MIN MILLER AND CLAIRE BRACKMAN KEANE, ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH 216 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MILLER &
KEANE, ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE]. The terms surgical castration, cas-
tration, bilateral orchiectomy, and orchiectomy may be used interchangeably throughout
this Article, and mean the removal of both testes. For a description of surgical castration,
see infra Part II.B.2.c.
14. See infra Part II.B.c.; D.A.G. Cook, There is a Place for Surgical Castration in the
Management of Recidivist Sex Offenders, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 791, 791 (1993) (explaining that
when psychological and behavioral programs fail and chemical methods to suppress libido
have been unsatisfactory, "there may be a case for surgical castration").
15. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
16. See, e.g., Anita Szoke, Man Pleads Guilty to Assaulting 6-Year-Old Girl, STATE J.
REGISTER (Springfield, IL), Jan. 14, 1997, at 2 (reporting that the father of a child molesta-
tion victim wants to have a state law that would impose a death penalty upon child molest-
ers); Jim Breig, Labeling Sex Offenders Won't Protect Children, 61(11) U.S. CATHOLIC 13
(1996) (summarizing selected responses from readers to advance copies of an article on sex
offenders, one response which stated, "[s/top opposing the death penalty for murder and
other heinous crimes"); Maria Soledad Bejarano & Asieh Namdar, President of Ecuador
Demands Tougher Punishment for Child Molesters, CNN WORLD REPORT (transcript
#96102007V79), Oct. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file (stating that
the President of Ecuador has proposed harsher punishment, including the death penalty,
for convicted child molesters); Kellie McMaster, Network Points Out Convicted Child Mo-
lesters, STUART NEws/PoRT ST. LUCIE NEWS (Stuart, Fla.), Oct. 14, 1996, at Al (reporting
on a vigilante group distributing fliers containing names of convicted child molesters to city
residents; one resident stated, "[i]t's just a matter of time before this information will make
someone murder someone... [b]ut that's a small price to protect children, isn't it? ... [t/he
death of a child molester"); Marlise Simons, Belgium's Pedophile Case Inciting Support for
Restoration of Death Penalty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 23, 1996, at 49A.
17. See generally Simons, supra note 16.
18. See, e.g., John Gunn, Controversies in Treatment: Castration is Not the Answer, 307
BRIT. MED. J. 790, 790-791 (1993) (arguing that results following surgery have been con-
flicting, that the operation is mutilating and has a risk of being carried out coercively, that
more effective alternatives exist, that suicide is a known hazard resulting from surgical
castration, and that other more serious clinical needs, such as personality and behavior
problems, may go unmet) [hereinafter Gunn, Controversies]; Nigel Eastman, Surgical Cas-
tration for Sex Offenders, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 1140-41 (1993) (remarking that some persons
suggest that all pedophilic offenders may have personality disorders, making them inappro-
priate candidates for surgical castration because such patients may have many underlying
reasons for requesting surgical castration that have little to do with desiring treatment for a
well-defined disorder); Reinhard Wille & Klaus M. Beier, Castration in Germany, 2 AN-
NALS SEX RES. 103, 109-110 (1989).
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Courts have relied on arguments from both sides at different times to
uphold or invalidate laws that purport to punish or to provide treatment
for persons who are incarcerated, albeit in dissimilar contexts, and it is
likely that the same arguments will be used to enact or to challenge legis-
lation or laws providing for the surgical castration of sex offenders such as
pedophiles. 19
The implications of enacting laws that permit the surgical castration of
incarcerated sex offenders, especially as such laws apply to pedophilic of-
fenders, is the subject of this Article. In Part II, the nature of sex offend-
ing, pedophilia disorder, and its treatment, with a particular focus on
surgical castration, is reviewed in detail. Four examples of recent legisla-
tive responses to the problem of sex offending involving children, all of
which were enacted and more or less sanction surgical castration, are ana-
lyzed in Part III. Parts IV and V provide an examination of the most
significant legal issues raised by surgical castration and include analyses
of cases specific to castration and to other cases relevant to our discus-
sion. These cases provide some insight as to how legislation pertaining to
surgical castration may be legally and ethically construed in the context of
medical treatment. We conclude by suggesting that permitting incarcer-
ated pedophiles-convicted of sex offenses against children-to undergo
voluntarily surgical castration within the context of treatment for their
pedophilia disorder is both constitutionally defensible and morally
permissible.
II. PEDOPHILIA AND ITS TREATMENT
Despite what appears to be some agreement among experts who deal
in such matters as the harmful effects of sexual abuse upon child vic-
tims, 20 a review of the relevant literature reveals variability as to what is
The revival or implementation of penological practices that invoke "punishments from
Puritan days" is nothing new, despite a history of being rejected. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter,
Judge Rules Against Alabama's Prison "Hitching Posts," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at A14
(reporting on a federal magistrate's decision declaring as unconstitutional punishment an
Alabama prison's use since 1993 of hitching posts-or "restraining bars," described as simi-
lar or worse than pillories-to discipline inmates, apparently for upwards of seven hours at
a time in high or low temperatures without food, water, or the use of toilets).
19. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.
20. See Clare E. Cosentino & Michelle Collins, Sexual Abuse of Children: Prevalence,
Effects, and Treatment, 789 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES 45, 49-51, 54-59 (1996). The
authors' review of recent research leads them to observe that, aside from "psychosexual
disturbances," sexually abused children have symptoms-such as anxiety, depression, and
academic problems-often seen in child psychiatric patients, and although sexually abused
children have more serious behavior problems than non-abused children who have no out-
patient psychiatric history, sexually abused children have fewer behavior problems than
children with outpatient psychiatric histories. See id. at 50. Problems most specifically
related to child sexual abuse are sexualized behavior and gender conflict. See id. at 49-50.
Sexualized behavior refers to inappropriate and interpersonally dysfunctional behavior
that is influenced and shaped by sexual abuse, where misconceptions about sexual behav-
ior and sexual morality are acquired. See id. at 56. For example, a child may exchange sex
for affection and attention, and may associate sexuality with violence and aggression. See
id. Compulsive masturbation and seductive behavior may also occur. See id.
[Vol. 51
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meant by pedophilia, what causes it, and how it is most effectively
treated.
A. THE NATURE OF PEDOPHILIA
1. Definition of Pedophilia
Pedophilia is one among many disorders loosely categorized as
paraphilias-psychosexual disorders such as transvestitism, exhibition-
ism, sexual masochism, and sexual sadism in which unusual or bizarre
imagery or acts are necessary for realization of sexual excitement. 21 One
medical reference describes a paraphilia as a "[g]ross impairment in the
capacity for affectionate sexual activity between adult human partners"
and notes that a paraphilia can be diagnosed by a person's behavior or, in
the absence of behavior, where a person is "markedly distressed by 're-
current intense sexual urges and sexually arousing fantasies of at least 6
[months] duration.' ' 22 Interestingly, many paraphiliacs have multiple
sexual deviations, and many progress from one deviation to another.
23
As a particular paraphilic disorder, pedophilia is a desire or preference
for sexual relations with prepubertal children. 24 The disorder is labeled
child molestation instead of pedophilia where the child victim is
postpubertal, but the distinction is sometimes characterized as arbitrary;
persons who have sexual interests in postpubertal children are called
hebophiles, but clearly both pedophiles and hebophiles are child molest-
Gender conflicts refer to a child's ambivalence about his or her own gender and manifes-
tations of cross-gender behavior. See id. Sexually abused children may act like, and wish
to be, the opposite sex. See id. at 49. Sexually abused girls acquire negative associations
with being female and may identify with masculine roles in order to deny their victim roles
and overcome fright and helplessness associated with trauma. See id. at 56-57. Sexually
abused boys experience sexual identity confusion and fears about homosexuality, "which
may be related to the homoerotic implications of the sexual contact," as well as fears that
they may become child sexual abusers themselves. See id. at 57. Sexually abused children
also experience attachment disturbances, including distrust of adults and therapists, as well
as dissociation, including suppression of conscious awareness of the sexual abuse. See id. at
57-59. The degree of symptomology is influenced when the victimizer is someone close to
the child, when the abuse occurs over a long period of time, and when the frequency of
sexual contact is high. See id. at 50. Sexual acts that involve oral, anal, or vaginal penetra-
tion or that is violent or involve physical force are associated with increased trauma. See
id. Some differences between sexually abused boys and girls have been noted, the most
apparent being that girls tend to exhibit sexually reactive (e.g., sexualized or seductive)
behavior that may place them at further risk of sexual abuse, while boys have a greater
tendency towards sexual aggression and engaging in coercive sexual behavior with other
children, especially if the boys experienced physical violence and anal penetration. See id.
at 51.
21. See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1326 (16th ed. 1989) [hereinaf-
ter TABER'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY].
22. MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1570 (16th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
MERCK MANUAL].
23. See J. D. Bloom et. al., An Overview of Psychiatric Treatment Approaches to Three
Offender Groups, 39(2) Hosv. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 152; see also Saunders &
Awad, infra note 78, at 573.
24. See TABER'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 1344; MERCK MANUAL,




2 5 THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS gives the following criteria for pedophilia:
1) An impairment lasting at least 6 months, with recurrent and
intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors that
involve sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children (gener-
ally age 13 years or younger);
25. See MERCK MANUAL, supra note 22; but cf Prendergast, supra note 7, at 140-42.
The author explains the important characteristics of, and distinctions between,
pedophiles-whose sexual interests involve prepubertal children, and hebophiles-whose




Victim age preference: pre-pubertal, anorgasmic.
Victim age preference: post-pubertal, orgasmic.
2
Age bracket choice depends on the level of inadequacy. A general rule is
that the more inadequate the offender, the younger the child victim.
Age bracket choice usually reflects that age at which he was happiest sexu-
ally and otherwise. This may be considered his age of psychosexual fixation.
3
Offender is usually fixated.
Offender is usually regressed. The group includes the incestuous fathers.
4
fender's need is to please the child sexually for acceptance. Often uses "sex
education" as a ploy.
Offender's need is to have a sex partner. Considers his behavior as "having
an affair."
5
The sexual behavior is usually one-sided with the offender "pleasing" the
child victim.
The sexual behavior is usually two-sided with reciprocation a need of the
offender.
6
Gross immaturity and inadequacy prevail.
This group is usually more mature with a good adult faqade.
7
Employment goals are usually below potential. This group prefers passive
and subservient positions.
Employment goals are age and potential oriented. This group often contains
professionals and successful businessmen.
8
Socially, this group fears both their peers as well as adults. They are comfort-
able only with other inadequate males or children.
Socially, this group gets along well with peers on most levels except sexually.
9
Treatment time is usually a long-term battle for the smallest, visible or ob-
servable changes.
Treatment time usually reflects rapid growth; changes appear sooner and are
more easily observed or proven.
10
Prognosis is extremely poor. This group comprises the most failures of all
sex offender groups in treatment.
Prognosis is good. There are more strengths to work with and the success
rate is relatively high.
Id. at 141. For purposes of this Article, pedophilia and pedophiles will include hebophiles
and child molestation; distinctions, where relevant, will be noted.
[Vol. 51
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2) Fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors that cause clinically signifi-
cant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other impor-
tant areas of functioning; and,
3) The impaired person is at least aged 16 years, and at least 5
years older than the child or children.2 6
From these definitions, it is clear that a pedophile is not a sex offender
until he engages in a legally proscribed act.27 Conversely, a person who
commits a sexual offense that involves a child may not be a pedophile if,
for example, the behavior or fixation is short-lived. A man who rapes a
child, for instance, may not be a pedophile. The popular notion that rap-
ists are motivated by power and pedophiles by sex not only seems facile,
but is of little help in determining who should be eligible for what kinds
of treatment. With this in mind, the next section contains data concern-
ing both what are normally categorized as pedophilic acts and sexual
assaults.
2. Sex Offenses and Sex Offenders
a. Incidence of Sex Offenses
Many persons now in prison were placed there based upon convictions
for "violent sex offenses," including rape and sexual assault.28 The U.S.
Department of Justice reports that 9.7% of state prisoners in 1994 were
violent sex offenders.29 The self-reports of state prisoners convicted of
rape or sexual assault indicate that two-thirds were "child victimizers"
(victims aged seventeen years or less), and fifty-eight percent of those
said their victims were twelve years or younger. 30 Additionally, in one
study of crime data reported to police in three states, fifteen percent of
rape victims were under age twelve, and twenty-nine percent of rape vic-
tims were between the ages of twelve and seventeen. 31 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice also reports that ninety percent of rape victims under age
26. See DSM-IV, supra note 7, at 527-28; see also MERCK MANUAL, supra note 22, at
1570. The age difference and the age of the person with this diagnosis are arbitrary. See id.
27. Absent the act, a person cannot generally be compelled to undergo treatment or
otherwise be charged with a crime or be incarcerated simply because the person has a
pedophilia disorder. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (finding a state
law that made having a disease-in this case a narcotic addiction-a crime punishable by
imprisonment to be in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
28. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD VICIMIZERS: VIO-
LENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 1 (1996) [hereinafter CHILD VICTIMIZERS]. Violent
sex offenses categorized under rape and sexual assault include forcible rape, forcible sod-
omy, statutory rape, lewd acts with children (fondling, molestation, or indecent practices)
and other sexual assault. See id. at 2. The numbers presented in this report were extrapo-
lated from interviews of 13,986 state prison inmates to the entire U.S. state prison popula-
tion, using data collected from 277 state prisons. See id. at 23-24. The survey was
conducted for the Bureau of Justice Statistics by the U.S. Bureau of the Census over a
three-month period in 1991. See id. at 23.
29. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFLED, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OF-
FENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPES AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (1997) [hereinafter
SEX OFFENDERS].
30. See id. at iii.
31. See Fox Butterfield, 1995 Data Show Sharp Drop in Reported Rapes, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 1997, at A14.
1998]
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twelve knew the offender, and that two-thirds of victims eighteen to
twenty-nine years old had a prior relationship with their rapist.32 Star-
tlingly, while the average annual growth in the number of prisoners since
1980 has been about 7.6%, the number of prisoners sentenced for violent
sexual assault other than rape increased by an annual average of nearly
fifteen percent, faster than any other category except drug trafficking.33
More recent reports appear to confirm that typical rape or sexual as-
sault victims are children or adolescent girls, and that one of the most
notable risk factors for rape or sexual assault, especially for girls, is the
presence of a stepfather as part of the household.34 Girls raised with
stepfathers are over seven times more likely to be sexually abused by
them than girls raised in households with their natural fathers.35
Although studies suggest that girls rather than boys are at a higher risk
for sexual abuse, with two to four girls for every boy sexually assaulted,
boys are believed to be underrepresented and may therefore be at greater
risk of sexual assault than is now known.36 This underrepresentation may
be due to the "male enculturation" process, which may make boys less
likely to admit to victimization, especially since sexual abuse for boys can
carry the stigma of homosexuality. 37 Girls are considered more willing
than boys to disclose sexual abuse, and girls often serve as a third-party
conduit through which sexual abuse of their brothers is discovered.38 Un-
like girls, however, boys are more frequently subject to anal abuse and
have more physical indicators of abuse; they are also more likely to be
forcefully abused, to be victimized outside the family, and to be abused
by younger offenders, typically older adolescents. 39
32. See SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 29, at iii. The statistic comes from police-re-
corded incident data. See id.
33. See id. at vi.
34. See Cosentino & Collins, supra note 20, at 48.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 47-48.
37. Id.; see also Bill Watkins & Arnon Bentovim, The Sexual Abuse of Male Children
and Adolescents: A Review of Current Research, 33 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 197,
201-03 (1992). The authors describe boys' enculturation process whereby "self-reliance,
independence, and sexual prowess are valued," whereas showing hurt or homosexuality is
disparaged. Id. at 202. Once victimized, boys may repress the sexual abuse experience and
consequently fail to report the abuse. See id. The authors state that it is a "common
clinical experience for boys to feel that because they responded [to the sexual abuse], it
must mean that whoever victimized them knew they would react and had therefore picked
them out because of some 'sign' of homosexuality." Id. The authors also state that shame
may be a powerful factor in keeping boys from reporting sexual abuse, and that even when
sexual abuse is uncovered, boys may be extremely reluctant to discuss the sexual abuse
during therapy regardless of the therapeutic setting or the therapist's gender. See id. Many
other factors may also account for underreporting of sexual abuse of boys, including lack
of supervision, differential reaction by boys to sexual abuse, missing alertors to sexual
abuse of boys, blaming the boy for the sexual abuse experience, and denial of sexual abuse
of boys. See id. at 202-09.
38. See Cosentino & Collins, supra note 20, at 48. A review of samples taken from
other studies lead the authors to state that between 3 and 29% of boys experience sexual
assault. See id. at 47-48.
39. See id. at 48 (citations omitted).
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Another distinctive feature of child sexual offending is that a single
child molester may have many victims or may victimize the same child
many times over, committing hundreds of sexual acts on many children. 40
One study found that self-reported child molesters had an average of sev-
enty-two victims, but given the tendency of offenders to minimize their
number of offenses, this number may be even higher.41 Another study
indicates that pedophiles who are interdicted but who go untreated will
often repeat their offending behavior-sex offense recidivism rates for
untreated pedophiles who engage in incest 42 are between four and ten
percent, while sex offense recidivism rates for untreated, non-familial
child sexual abusers are between ten and forty percent. 43 Sex offense
recidivism rates for male sex offenders are reportedly as high as fifty per-
cent, and depend upon such factors as demographic characteristics, crimi-
nal history and legal disposition of the offender, the offender's particular
paraphilia, amenability of the offender to treatment, and the amount of
community and family support available to the offender. 44
All told, it is estimated that between 100,000 and 500,000 children in
the United States are sexually molested each year.45 Between 1980 and
1992, the number of child sexual abuse cases tripled, from 37,336 cases in
1980 to 128,556 in 1992.46 This increase has been attributed to an in-
crease in actual identification and reporting of child sexual abuse rather
than an increase in the actual occurrence of child sexual abuse. 47 Gener-
ally, however, the actual scope of child sexual abuse is not known but
only estimated because the majority of sexually abused children never
40. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 603.
41. See Margit C. Henderson, Sexually Deviant Behavior and Schizotypy: A Theoreti-
cal Perspective With Supportive Data, 61 PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY 273 (1990).
42. "Incest" is defined as "sexual relations between persons immediately related by
blood." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 507. Legal definitions of in-
cest may be broader and may include, for example, sexual intercourse between members of
a family whether or not the participants are immediately related by blood. See, e.g., TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02(a) (Vernon 1994) (providing that an individual commits a third
degree felony if the individual engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse
with a person he knows to be an ancestor or descendant by adoption, a stepchild or step-
parent, or the children of a brother or sister of the whole or half blood or by adoption).
43. See Fred S. Berlin et al., A Five-Year Plus Follow-Up Survey of Criminal Recidi-
vism Within a Treated Cohort of 406 Pedophiles, 111 Exhibitionists and 109 Sexual Aggres-
sives: Issues and Outcome, 12 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 5, 8 (1991) [hereinafter Berlin,
Five-Year Follow-Up] (citing W.L. Marshall & H.E. Barbaree, Outcome of Comprehensive
Cognitive-Behavioral-Treatment Programs, HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES, THE-
ORIES AND TREATMENT OF THE OFFENDER (W.L. Marshall et al. eds, 1990)).
44. See Monique Richer and M. Lynn Crimson, Pharmacotherapy of Sexual Offenders,
27 ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 317 (1993).
45. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 602 (citations omitted).
46. See Cosentino & Collins, supra note 20, at 47; see also Fred S. Berlin, The Case for
Castration, Part 2, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1994, at 28 [hereinafter Berlin, Case for Castra-
tion]; Berlin, Five-Year Follow-Up, supra note 43, at 6 (citing a 1986 study by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services that found that two out of every 1000 children
in the U.S. have been sexually abused, a figure that totaled 138,000).
47. See Cosentino & Collins, supra note 20, at 47.
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come to the attention of child protection agencies or professionals.4 8 Ad-
ditionally, the nature of sexual abuse, including "the secrecy and shame
surrounding it, the criminal prohibitions against it, and the young age and
dependent status of its victim[s]," serves to limit identification, disclosure,
and reporting of child sexual abuse. 49 In essence, child sexual abuse may
be a much larger problem than it appears.
b. Characteristics of and Distinctions Among Sex Offenders
The majority of sexual abuse is committed by males who exhibit the
following characteristics: a lack of close, healthy relationships with other
persons; feelings of having been deprived of love in infancy; and marked
dependency needs that indicate the offender is unable to communicate
correctly.50 Male sex offenders also tend to be rigid in their ways of ad-
justing to their environment-regardless of their intelligence level-and
the majority of male sex offenders believe that sex is dirty and disgust-
ing.51 One study found that pedophiles in particular typically have inade-
quate relationships with adult women, are emotionally and physically
underdeveloped, and have immature personalities. 52
Researchers have tried to categorize sexual offenders based upon their
behaviors and characteristics. One such attempt resulted in the delinea-
tion of three types of sexual offenders: the pedophile-fixated type, who
has never been able to maintain mature relationships with peers; the
pedophile-regressive type, who manages to have some mature relation-
ships, but following a confrontation with another person concerning his
sexual adequacy or a threat to his masculine image, starts engaging in
pedophilic acts; and the pedophile-aggressive type, who generally selects
boys for sexually sadistic acts. 53 Another study supported the pedophilic
stereotype of a weak, passive, socially isolated, inept man who uses chil-
dren for sexual fulfillment; this study found that characteristics common
to sex offenders included the offenders having lower IQs; a higher fre-
quency of avoidant and dependent personalities; a tendency to present
themselves as introverted, shy, sensitive, lonely, depressed, and humor-
less; and having a greater number of siblings with psychiatric problems.54
Additionally, it has been found that pedophiles are less prone to drug and
alcohol abuse, are sickly as children, and have been given diagnoses that
support their view of themselves.5 5 Somewhat similarly but noteworthy,
48. See id.; see also Fuller, supra note 13, at 603 (citing a 1983 article that indicated
that less than six percent of child molestations are ever reported).
49. Cosentino & Collins, supra note 20, at 47.
50. See Guilio di Furia, On the Treatment and Disposition of Sexual Offenders, 65 N.W.
MED. 629, 631 (1966).
51. See id.
52. See Sheldon Travin et al., Pedophile Types and Treatment Perspectives, 31 J. FOREN-
sic Sci. 614, 615 (1986) [hereinafter Travin, Pedophile Types].
53. Id.
54. See M. Ashley Ames, Legal, Social, and Biological Definitions of Pedophilia, 19
ARCHIVES Soc. BEHAV. 333, 337-38 (1990).
55. See id. at 338.
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a 1991 study involving males who were engaged in man-boy lover rela-
tionships indicated that those males had feelings of guilt, low self-esteem,
depressive moods, and an extreme concern about their erotic and sexual
feelings being discovered.56 Given this profile, it is not surprising that
pedophiles and child molesters generally refuse to admit to their abusive
acts and the extent of their sexual acts, and will often only acknowledge
their activities as fondling. 57 As a rule, it has only been in therapy that
sexual offenders admit to having feelings of gratification, revenge, excite-
ment, escape, revulsion, and severe guilt for their offending sex behav-
ior.58 Unfortunately, the abhorrent attitude that society has toward
sexual disorders may make them more difficult to detect and to research.
Interestingly, one of the studies referred to above found that the char-
acteristics of men who were involved in incestuous relationships are sig-
nificantly different from the characteristics of non-familial pedophiles. In
incest cases, alcohol use by the sex offender is frequently involved,
diagnosable mental problems are seldom displayed, the offenders are
either very dominant or very passive but rarely in between, and families
where incest occurs have pronounced disorganization and disturbed mari-
tal relationships. 59 However, many behaviorists see incest as the cause
rather than the result of the dysfunctional state of the family, and an
adult incest offender is not usually differentiated from a pedophile other
than by his access to the victim. 60
A number of researchers have found that pedophiles exhibit an exces-
sively high sexual drive, which may be physiological in nature and which
causes their deviant behavior.61 Other physiological characteristics have
been studied, and the research indicates that penile arousal patterns to
audio and visual stimuli can be used to identify rapists and child molest-
ers in order to determine age and gender preferences, as well as to docu-
ment the offender's propensity for violence.62 A supporting study found
56. See Alex van Naerssen, Man-Boy Lovers: Assessment, Counseling, and Psycho-
therapy, 20 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 175, 180 (1990).
57. See Travin, Pedophile Types, supra note 52, at 617.
58. See di Furia, supra note 50, at 631.
59. See id.
60. See Travin, Pedophile Types, supra note 52, at 615.
61. See Gertjan Van Zessen, A Model for Group Counseling with Male Pedophiles, 20
J. HOMOSEXUALITY 189, 190 (1990); see also Travin, Pedophile Types, supra note 52, at 615-
16.
62. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 603. The technical term for the study of penile erectile
measurements is "penile plethysmography" or "phallometry." See D. Richard Laws, Di-
rect Monitoring by Penile Plethysmography, in RELAPSE PREVENTION WITH SEX OFFEND-
ERS 105, 105 (D. Richard Laws ed., 1989). An electronic sensor device, called a penile
transducer, is attached around the shaft of the penis. See id. at 105-06. The penile trans-
ducer sensor detects changes in penis size, beginning from a state of flaccidity to one of
complete engorgement. See id. at 106. Measurements of the patient's penis are taken
while erotic stimuli are provided to the patient; this erotic stimuli include slides or audi-
otaped descriptions of both deviant and non-deviant behavior. See id. Since patients may
respond differently to some stimuli over others, such measured differential amplitudes in
response provide the patient's clinicians with indications about the patient's sexual inter-
ests and preferences. See id. The author states that many researchers and clinicians be-
lieve that erectile response is a highly powerful measure for assessing and treating sexual
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that pedophiles are more easily identified by using penile erectile mea-
surements than by any other technique, and that violent pedophiles show
significant arousal in the laboratory to physical aggression.63
Females represent another, although smaller, group of child sexual
abusers. One study found that women are responsible for five percent of
the reported sexual abuse cases involving girls and twenty percent of the
cases involving boys,64 and a second study found that women were re-
sponsible for child sexual abuse in six to fourteen percent of the cases
involving girls and in fourteen to twenty-four percent of the cases involv-
ing boys. 65 However, a study of twenty-three cases of child sexual abuse
by females found that in twenty-one of the cases of forced sexual inter-
course, the females were acting in consort with a male perpetrator. 66
Not surprisingly, the characteristics of female pedophiles and child mo-
lesters differ somewhat from males. In general, female sex offenders not
only have more severe levels of psychopathology and personal victimiza-
tion than their male counterparts, 67 but they also frequently exhibit a his-
tory of psychiatric impairment and disturbed childhood, including sexual
victimization, as well as a high incidence of major depression and sub-
stance abuse, which appear to be related to their mistreatment by, and
disappointment with, parental figures and adult love objects.68
Adolescents comprise the last category of child sexual abusers. A juve-
nile sexual offender is defined as a youth, from puberty to the legal age of
majority, who commits any sexual act with a person of any age, against
the victim's will, without consent, or in an aggressive, exploitative or
threatening manner. 69 Historically, sexual abuse and molestation of chil-
dren by teens has been labeled "curiosity" or "experimentation," and
many sexual offenses have been termed "adolescent adjustment reac-
disorders, especially when used in conjunction with other assessment tools. See id. In fact,
penile plethysmography may "equal or exceed" the psychometric properties of more tradi-
tional measurement techniques, and is thought to be an essential component of an effective
sex offender treatment program. Id. This is because penile plethysmography is able to
measure a core element of deviant sexual orientation, deviant sexual fantasy and arousal,
that may otherwise not be effectively addressed by a particular treatment program. See id.
However, it is said that 73% of sex offender treatment programs in the U.S. do not under-
take penile measurement as part of the program. See id. at 113. For this reason, it may be
difficult to assess the value of any sex offender treatment program, or to measure success
rates between various treatment programs, absent standardized measurements that devices
such as the penile plethysmography appear to provide.
63. See Travin, Pedophile Types, supra note 52, at 616.
64. See Sheldon Travin et al., Female Sex Offenders: Severe Victims and Victimizers, 35
J. FORENSIC ScI. 140,141 (1990) [hereinafter Travin, Female Sex Offenders]; see also Fuller,
supra note 13, at 602.
65. See Arthur H. Green & Meg S. Kaplan, Psychiatric Impairment and Childhood
Victimization Experiences in Female Child Molesters, 33 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLES-
CENT PSYCHIATRY 954 (1994) (citing AM. HUMANE Ass'N (1981); NAT'L CENTER FOR
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, (1981)).
66. See Travin, Female Sex Offenders, supra note 64, at 141.
67. See id. at 140.
68. See Green & Kaplan, supra note 65, at 954, 960.
69. See Gail Ryan et al., Juvenile Sex Offenders: Development and Correction, 11
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 385, 385-86 (1987).
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tions. '' 70 This may contribute to the fact that, although incidence figures
that are obtained from victim reports and arrest statistics indicate that
approximately twenty percent of all rapes and thirty to fifty percent of
child molestation cases were perpetrated by adolescent offenders,71 child
sexual abuse may be underreported by as much as eighty percent, mean-
ing that only about twenty percent of the sexual abuse victims actually
have their victimization reported.72
Unfortunately, more adolescent pedophiles than adult pedophiles seem
to be resistant to any form of treatment, and to have significantly higher
sex offense relapse rates.73 One study of 221 juvenile sex offenders found
that 44.8% were convicted of one or more subsequent criminal offenses;
however, of those offenders who recidivate, the rate of new convictions
for violent crimes was 6.6%, while the rate of new convictions for sexual
crimes was 7.5%.74 Thus, although nearly half of the juvenile sexual of-
fenders committed new misdemeanors and non-violent felonies, sexual
reoffenses were relatively rare. 75
Another study, involving a review of the research literature covering
twenty-one different treatment outcome investigations of child or adoles-
cent offenders occurring between 1942 and 1992, found that the rate of
sexual reoffense among sex offenders who were adolescents ranged be-
tween two and seventy-five percent, an extremely high variance. 76 An
important concern raised by the lack of more rigorous studies and better
understanding of the nature, treatment, and treatment outcome of ado-
lescent pedophilia is that it will be difficult to undertake effective in-
terdiction and treatment for the high number of young sex offenders who
go on to a lifetime of child sexual abuse. 77
Not surprisingly, adolescent male sex offenders share a number of char-
acteristics with their adult male and female counterparts. Specifically, ad-
olescent male sex offenders repeatedly exhibit a history of delinquency
and psychiatric impairment before their first sexual offense; severe family
problems; separations from parents and placements away from home; ne-
glect and abuse, both physical and sexual; social awkwardness or isola-
tion; academic or behavioral problems at school; low IQs;
psychopathology, including primarily neurotic, conduct, and personality
70. See id.; see also Eileen Vizard et al., Child and Adolescent Sex Abuse Perpetrators:
A Review of the Research Literature, 36 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 731, 734 (1995).
Vizard and her co-authors suggest that such characterizations may lead to underreporting
and underestimating the incidence and prevalence of child sexual abuse by other children
or adolescents. 'See id.
71. See Judith V. Becker et al., Measuring the Effectiveness of Treatment for the Ag-
gressive Adolescent Sexual Offender, 528 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 215 (1988).
72. See Vizard et al., supra note 70, at 735.
73. See Nathaniel McConaghy et al., Resistance to Treatment of Adolescent Sex Offend-
ers, 18 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 97 (1989).
74. See Timothy J. Kahn & Heather J. Chambers, Assessing Reoffense Risk with Juve-
nile Sexual Offenders, 70 CHILD WELFARE 333 (1991).
75. See id.
76. See Vizard et al., supra note 70, at 746-47.
77. See id. at 749-50.
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disorders; and neurological impairment.78 The history of sexual victimi-
zation common in both juvenile and adult sex offenders suggests a cyclical
pattern of sexual abuse, which is not only a characteristic of sexual abuse,
but may be a part of its etiology as well. 79
B. ETIOLOGY AND TREATMENT
1. Etiology and Course of Pedophilia
Simply stated, there is no consensus as to the etiology or cause of
pedophilia. Some researchers argue that the cause of pedophilia remains
undetermined. 80 Other researchers claim that pedophilia's etiology is es-
tablished, and argue that sexual deviance is a learned phenomenon in
which early sexual experience is significant, as opposed to sexual devi-
ance having a genetic or biological origin. 81 What is clear is that the moti-
vation for and cause of child sexual abuse are complex, consist of both
sexual and non-sexual factors, and that "[i]ndividuality with regard to eti-
ology of paraphilia is the [general] rule."'82
Research has shown that predisposing and maintaining factors of
pedophilia include "stress, dysfunctional home situations, familial vio-
lence, substance abuse, interpersonal deficits, failure of the incest taboo,
anti-social mores .... distorted beliefs," and previous experience of sex-
ual abuse.83 Child molesting behavior has also been associated with "hy-
pothalamic lesions, alterations in neurotransmitters, seizure disorders,
postencephalitic parkonsonism, and other organic mental syndromes. '84
One review of the literature took pedophilia in a broad sense as encom-
passing all sexual activity with a child and yielded a four-factor summary
of theoretical formulations with respect to the causes of pedophilia:
[(1)] Sexual arousal[:] For an adult to be "turned on" by a child,
there has to have been cultural or familial conditioning to sexual ac-
tivity with children, victimization as a child, or early fantasy rein-
forced by masturbation[;]
[(2)] Emotional congruence[:] For emotional congruence, there is a
level of comfort and satisfaction in relating to a child and a fit of
emotional need. Frequently this is due to arrested development
either through retardation, immaturity, or low self-esteem[;]
78. See Elisabeth B. Saunders & George A. Awad, Assessment, Management, and
Treatment Planning for Male Adolescent Sexual Offenders, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
571, at 571-72 (October 1988).
79. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 386.
80. See David M. Greenberg et al., A Comparison of Sexual Victimization in the Child-
hoods of Pedophiles and Hebephiles, 38 J. FORENSIC Sci. 432 (1993); see also di Furia,
supra note 50, at 629.
81. See Patricia Sermabeikian & D. Martinez, Treatment of Adolescent Sexual Offend-
ers: Theory-Based Practice, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 969, 970 (1994).





[(3)] Blockage[:] Adult sexual opportunities may be blocked by
traumatic experience with adult sexuality, sexual dysfunction, inade-
quate social skills, or marital disturbance[; and]
[(4)] Disinhibition[:] The pedophile may be disinhibited or lose
control characterologically via impulse disorder, chronically via or-
ganicity or psychosis, acutely via alcohol, drugs, or situational stress,
or culturofamilially via nonexistent family rules.8 5
One researcher notes that, because of the reinforcing nature of sexual
behaviors, the deviant acts of a sex offender may become repetitive, in-
graining deviant patterns that become habitual, and that such sexual be-
haviors may progress to incorporate more serious and more deviant
sexual acts.86 Moreover, the sex offender's perception of positive feelings
of power and control, combined with physical gratification provided by
the sexual offense, begins to outweigh the potential negative conse-
quences of the sex-offending behavior. 87 Given the divergent nature of
reported findings and opinions related to the etiology and course of
pedophilia and pedophilic sex-offending, it follows that the treatment for
these conditions is also marked by variability.
2. Treatment
There are a number of different types of treatment available for
pedophiles and child molesters. These include the use of biological or
pharmacological approaches, stereotaxic neurosurgery, and surgical cas-
tration-an important objective of which is to bring about a reduction in
an offender's sexual drive or urges by, for example, inhibiting an of-
fender's testosterone level.88 All of the above methods are dependent
upon the complex interactions between higher central nervous system
functions, located in the cortex and limbic systems, and neuroendocrine
mechanisms mediated via the hypothalamic pituitary axis, the gonads,
and their various feed-back mechanisms.8 9 Other forms of treatment in-
clude traditional individual, group, and family psychotherapy, as well as
psychotherapy which emphasizes cognitive or behavioral approaches, one
or more of which may even be used in conjunction with biological or
pharmacological treatment.90
85. Edward L. Rowan, Predicting the Effectiveness of Treatment for Pedophilia, 33 J.
FORENSIC SCi. 204, 205 (1988).
86. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 389-92.
87. See id.
88. See John M. W. Bradford, The Hormonal Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 11 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRIC L. 159 (1983); see also John M. W. Bradford & Anne Pawlak,
Effects of Cyproterone Acetate on Sexual Arousal Patterns of Pedophiles, 22 ARCHIVES SEX-
UAL BEHAV. 629 (1993); see generally SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
MEDICAL APPROACHES (Eli Coleman et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter SEX OFFENDER TREAT-
MENT]. The editors suggest that current treatment of sex offenders "involves interactive
biomedical plus psychiatric plus psychological approaches based upon sound perceptions
of the sources of criminal sexual behavior." Id. at 2.
89. SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT, supra note 88, at 2.
90. See Sheldon Travin et al., Pedophilia: An Update on Theory and Practice, 57 PSY-
CHIATRIC Q. 89, 99 (1985) [hereinafter Travin, Update]; J. Paul Federoff et al., Medroxy-
Progesterone Acetate in the Treatment of Paraphilic Sexual Disorders: Rate of Relapse in
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a. Biological or Pharmacological Treatment
The biological or pharmacological approach to the treatment of sex of-
fenders involves the use of various types of medications and hormones,
most intended to inhibit testosterone production in the body in order to
reduce sex drive; these medications and hormones are widely accepted as
treatment for suppressing paraphilic symptoms.91 Non-hormonal phar-
macological agents-such as serotonergic antidepressants-have also
been tried and show promise, but these results are based upon limited
studies and further research may need to be undertaken before such
drugs are more widely used. 92 Some researchers argue that only biologi-
cal or organic treatments such as anti-androgen treatment are feasible as
therapy for sex offending behavior at this time, but this position is clearly
contradicted by other researchers and clinicians who argue that an inte-
gral part of any sex offender treatment program involves psychotherapeu-
tic intervention-such as individual and group therapy-at least as long
as an offender receives pharmacological therapy. 93
Paraphilic Men Treated in Long-Term Group Psychotherapy With or Without Medroxy-
Progesterone Acetate, in SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT, supra note 88, at 109, 120-21 .
91. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 604. One such pharmacologic agent is an anti-andro-
gen called medroxyprogesterone acetate (also called MPA, as well as the trade name De-
poProvera®). See also Lee E. Emory et al., The Texas Experience with DepoProvera:
1980-1990, in SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT, supra note 88, at 125, 130. MPA has been used
in the U.S. since 1966 to control and ultimately eliminate sexual aggressiveness and devi-
ancy in males. See id. at 126. A counterpart drug, called cyproteroneacetate (CPA), is used
in Western Europe and Canada. See id. MPA lacks the side effects often associated with
hormone therapy, such as feminization (which includes breast enlargement, penile atrophy,
and female fat distribution). See id. MPA's main pharmacologic action is to inhibit testos-
terone production in the testes, but MPA has an initial effect on mood that occurs before
any reported changes in sexual fantasies. See id. A number of parameters are considered
to determine if an offender is suitable for MPA treatment, including whether the persons
admits to the offense, the presence of compelling sexual fantasies, compulsions that tend to
be overwhelming, and whether the person's deviant imagery or fantasy for sexual gratifica-
tion is so entrenched that they are even used in normal sexual activities with a consenting
partner. See id. at 127. The patient must understand that MPA needs to be given over a
long period of time, possibly three to five years, and often in conjunction with psychother-
apy. See id. Situations that are used to exclude the use of MPA include persons who do
not admit to their sexual offenses, but blame drugs, alcohol or their own abused childhood,
as well as persons who have severe dyssocial tendencies, such as brutal physical assault
resulting from severe sado-sexual tendencies. See id. at 128. Medical exclusion criteria
include a patient's potential for developing diabetes or a family history of diabetes, and
caution is exercised for persons with elevated serum cholesterol or increased risk for gall
bladder disease. See id. The initial dose of MPA (DepoProvera®) is 400 mg IM, which is
maintained weekly as the patient is interviewed for changes in sexual thought patterns. See
id. at 130-31. Experience has shown that three 400 mg doses, each a week apart, are neces-
sary before changes in sexual thought patterns are noticed. See id. at 131. Severe fatigue is
usually the first indication for a dose reduction, to 300 mg IM. See id. Three hundred mg
IM weekly or every other week thereafter is an acceptable dose for most men, and the
typical patient receives MPA for about two years before further dose tapering. See id.
92. See Eli Coleman et al., An Exploratory Study of the Role of Psychotropic Medica-
tions in the Treatment of Sex Offenders, in SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT, supra note 88, at
75, 84-86; John Bancroft et al., The Control of Deviant Sexual Behaviour by Drugs: L
Behavioural Changes Following Oestrogens and Anti-Androgens, 125 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY
310 (1974).
93. See Bradford & Pawlak, supra note 88, at 629-30; Emory et al., supra note 91, at
125, 130. The authors indicate that as part of the psychotherapeutic component of the sex
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Biological or pharmacological treatment does have drawbacks, how-
ever. For example, the use of estregens has been known to cause nausea,
vomiting, feminization, and, though rarely, carcinoma of the breast. 94
Another commonly used drug, medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA),
may cause weight gain, hypertension, mild lethargy, cold sweats, night-
mares, hot flashes, and muscle aches, and has been known to cause breast
and uterine cancer in animals.95 One eminent researcher also found that
pharmacological treatment with antiandrogens yielded inconsistent re-
sults and that recidivism occurred if treatment was stopped. 96
Proponents of the biological or pharmacological approach to the treat-
ment of sex offenders argue that it is superior to surgical castration be-
cause it involves no surgery and because compliance can readily be
monitored by means of periodic injections.97 Other proponents claim
that such drugs benefit the patient by helping the patient gain a greater
capacity for self-control, obtain relief from intrusive erotic obsessional
fantasies, and avoid the necessity for quarantine from the community. 98
Moreover, chemical castration is more likely to be accepted by "squeam-
ish" society than is surgical castration.99
b. Psychotherapeutic Treatment
Another widely accepted form of treatment for pedophiles and child
molesters is psychotherapy such as behavioral therapy, covert sensitiza-
tion, hypnosis, and marital therapy. Through psychotherapy, factors that
are associated with the offender's deviant acting-out are explored and the
offender's cognitive distortions are systematically broken down, with the
intention of enabling the offender to recognize the wrongfulness of his
behavior and to conform his behavior accordingly. 100 Some researchers
offender treatment program, which has been operating since 1976, offenders participate in
a monthly men's group where support and confrontation are seen as key elements for
uncovering the factors that are associated with the offenders' cognitive distortions that
have been used to perpetuate their behavior. See id. Through this psychotherapeutic com-
ponent of the program, offenders come to recognize that their behavior was "victimizing
and hurtful to others, often with serious and lifelong consequences." Id.
But cf. Prendergast, supra note 7, at 175-82. The author observes that one of the first
things that those who work with sex offenders learn is that "conventional techniques usu-
ally fail." Id. at 175. The author argues for a "holistic" approach to sex offender treat-
ment. See id. at 175-76.
94. See Bancroft et al., supra note 92, at 310.
95. See Fred S. Berlin & Edgar Krout, Pedophilia: Diagnostic Concepts, Treatment,
and Ethical Considerations, 7 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 13, 25 (1986).
96. See John M. W. Bradford, Organic Treatment for the Male Sexual Offender, 528
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 193, 197 (1988) [hereinafter Bradford, Organic Treatment].
97. See Berlin, supra note 46, at 29.
98. See J. T. Melella et al., Legal and Ethical Issues in the Use of Antiandrogens in
Treating Sex Offenders, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 223, 229 (1989).
99. See Berlin, Case for Castration, supra note 46, at 29 (noting that chemical castra-
tion might be far more palatable to a society in which many people are squeamish about
mandating surgical castration).
100. See Emory et al., supra note 91, at 130; Peter R. Kilman et al., The Treatment of
Sexual Paraphilias: A Review of the Outcome Research, 18(3) J. SEX RES. 193, 197 (1982).
For a much more thorough review of a promising treatment method, relapse prevention,
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have noted that a variety of other kinds of psychotherapies, including
family therapy, conjoint therapy, marital counseling, and cognitive ther-
apy, have been used in treating child molesters and pedophiles, but that
none has emerged as clearly superior.101 Other researchers and clinicians
who treat sexual offenders agree "that it is desirable to prevent new sex-
ual [offenses] by a purely psychological-sexological treatment[; and that]
... in a large number of cases[,] it would be possible to render sufficient
aid by psychological treatment, possibly combined with social meas-
ures. '' 102 A variant of the psychotherapy approach is a multi-factorial
treatment approach that includes corrective cognitive distortion; social
skills and sex education; decreased deviant arousal and increased non-
deviant arousal; 10 3 and orgasmic reconditioning in which the subjects
masturbate to orgasm while viewing different stimuli that change from
unacceptable to acceptable.10 4
However, research has indicated that there are some problems with
psychotherapy; specifically, there is disagreement as to whether any form
of psychotherapy, in and of itself-individual or group, superficial or
deep-is of any practical value in the treatment of the sexual offender if
reduction in reconviction rate is taken as a measure of success. 105 For
example, one study concluded that "psychoanalysis and individual (in-
sight-orient[ed]) psychotherapy, when not used in conjunction with other
forms of psychotherapy, are of little value in the treatment of
pedophiles.' 06 Moreover, even if the various forms of psychotherapy
are successful in treating some sexual offenders, there may still be a large
percentage of offenders who are not helped by psychotherapy.10 7 For this
reason, many advocates of a psychotherapeutic approach to the treat-
ment of pedophilia and child molestation support psychotherapy in con-
see generally RELAPSE PREVENTION, supra note 62, at 2. Relapse prevention is a self-
control program designed to teach individuals who are trying to change their behavior how
to anticipate and cope with the problems of relapse, or a breakdown or failure in a person's
attempt to change or modify any targeted behavior. See id. A relapse prevention program
focuses on enabling a person to prevent relapse and maintain a newly adopted and accept-
able behavior pattern, through a psychoeducational thrust that combines behavioral skills
training with cognitive intervention techniques. See id. Preliminary findings indicate that
persons who have participated in relapse prevention programs have more coping strategies
at their disposal and have learned the value of ongoing monitoring in the prevention of
relapse. See id. at 288. Unfortunately for child molesters, the lay community's response to
programs such as relapse prevention has been negative, with punishment and banishment
more often preferred than treatment. See id. And unfortunately for future victims, the lay
public finds it difficult to see the relationship between providing treatment to the offender
and protecting future victims. See id.
101. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 604.
102. Jorgen Ortmann, The Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 3 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
443 (1980).
103. See Rowan, supra note 85, at 205.
104. See A. D. VanDeventer & D. R. Laws, Orgasmic Reconditioning to Redirect Sexual
Arousal in Pedophiles, 9 BEHAV. THERAPY 748 (1978).
105. See L. H. Field, Benperidol in the Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 13 MED. Sci. L.
195 (1973).
106. Van Zessen, supra note 61, at 190.
107. See Ortmann, supra note 102, at 443-44.
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junction with some form of biological or pharmacological treatment. 108
c. Surgical Castration
Surgical castration involves the removal of a man's testes-which pro-
duce the male hormones: testicular androgens, such as testosterone, and
suprarenal sexual hormones-and has been used as a treatment for sex
offenders in a number of European countries. 09 Castration lowers the
level of testosterone in the body and diminishes the subject's sexual drive;
it must be emphasized that surgical castration does not involve removal of
the penis.10 Surgical castration is not an uncommon procedure, and in
fact is frequently clinically indicated in cases of testicular and prostrate
cancer, as well as in cases of injury to the testes. The effect of castration
upon sexual libido and sexual activity for persons who undergo
orchiectomy for purposes of treating cancer or injury is essentially no dif-
ferent than for persons who undergo orchiectomy for the purposes of
treating sexual deviant behavior such as pedophilia, except that the effect
is intended for the latter."'
108. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 604.
109. See Wille & Beier, supra note 18, at 107; Bradford, Organic Treatment, supra note
96, at 193; Berlin, Case for Castration, supra note 46, at 28-29.
110. See G. K. Sturup, Treatment of Sexual Offenders in Herstedvester, Denmark, the
Rapists, 204 AcTA PSYCHIATRY SCANDANAVIA 14 (1968); Berlin, Case for Castration,
supra note 46, at 28.
111. Several techniques for performing orchiectomies exist, and the technique used de-
pends on the intent of the surgery. See Dane K. Hermansen, Techniques of Orchiectomy,
in UROLOGIC SURGERY 900 (James F. Glenn ed., 4th ed. 1991). The most invasive
orchiectomy technique is a radical or inguinal orchiectomy, in which both the testes and
the spermatic cord within the scrotum, and the inguinal canal, are removed. See DAVID A.
CULP ET AL., SURGICAL UROLOGY 506, 510 (5th ed. 1985). This procedure requires an
incision similar to that made in inguinal hernia repair. See id. The procedure is performed
under general or spinal anesthesia and only if testicular carcinoma is suspected. See Brad
A. Wolfson & Jacob Rajfer, Simple and Radical Orchiectomy, in OPERATIVE UROLOGY
357, 357-58 (Fray F. Marshall ed., 1991) (emphasis added).
Another technique, particularly relevant here, is simple orchiectomy, which is done al-
most exclusively as a means of androgen deprivation therapy in patients with advanced
prostate cancer. See JACKSON E. FOWLER, MANUAL OF UROLOGIC SURGERY 201 (1990).
Under local anesthesia, a single, relatively bloodless, five centimeter longitudinal incision is
made down the middle of the scrotum. See id.; CULP ET AL., supra, at 506; Wolfson &
Rajfer, supra, at 357. Through this small incision, both testes can be removed. See PAT-
RICK C. WALSH ET AL., CAMPBELL'S UROLOGY 2960 (5th ed. 1986). During this proce-
dure, the testicular vessels and the vas deferens are identified, clamped separately, and
divided, and meticulous attention is given to minimizing bleeding (or obtaining excellent
hemostasis), which is done using cautery. See Wolfson & Rajfer, supra, at 357; Hermansen,
supra, at 902; STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 458. The epididymis
(essentially a reservoir for the spermatozoa) can be severed from the testes so that only the
latter is removed, leaving some tissue behind in the scrotum, but it is preferable that both
are removed when the procedure is meant to eliminate testicular androgen secretion; pur-
suant to removal of the testes (and if applicable, the epididymis) a normal looking scro-
tum-arguably a legitimate concern for any patient undergoing castration-can be
obtained with prosthetic implants. See WALSH ET AL., supra, at 2960-61; Hermansen,
supra, at 902; FOWLER, supra, at 201; STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at
342. Once the testicles are removed and hemostasis is obtained, the incision is closed in
two layers with sutures. See Hermansen, supra, at 902. Drainage of the wound is not
usually necessary, but can be done if there is a doubt as to hemostasis or if the procedure
involved complications. See id.; CULP ET AL., supra, at 506. Following the orchiectomy, a
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For many years, surgical castration has been advocated as a preventive
treatment for sexual offenders; nonetheless, like biological treatments
such as MPA treatment (loosely characterized, along with other pharma-
cological therapies used to reduce testosterone levels, as "chemical cas-
tration"), surgical castration does not completely preclude sexual
functioning, and-similar to the pharmacologic therapies noted earlier-
the effects of surgical castration upon libido can actually be reversed by
taking testosterone.112 One small study in particular found that forty per-
cent of castrates (eight of twenty) continue to have sexual intercourse
within three to seven years after the procedure, while another study
found that fifty percent of castrates (nineteen of thirty-eight) have full
erections while watching a sexually explicit movie within three to five
years after being castrated."13 A somewhat larger post-operative study
involving 104 sex offenders who underwent castration five years earlier
found that libido and sexual activity among the offenders was practically
extinct within six months of castration for over seventy-five percent of
castrates; libido and sexual activity were possible with intensive stimula-
tion for about fifteen percent of castrates, while about ten percent of the
castrates had reduced levels of libido and sexual activity." 4
Studies of libido and sexual activity aside, one of the most important
benefits of surgical castration is that it is very effective in reducing the
recidivism rates of pedophiles and child molesters. One researcher re-
ports that the four main studies investigating surgical castration demon-
strate that surgical castration is followed by a significant reduction in
dressing, scrotal support, and ice pack are usually applied. See WALSH ET AL., supra, at
2961; Wolfson & Rajfer, supra, at 357-58. The most frequent complication of orchiecto-
mies is postoperative hemorrhage, but this can be avoided with attention to hemostasis
during surgery and with pressure dressing. See Wolfson & Rajfer, supra, at 358.
Prosthetic implants of varying sizes can be used following an orchiectomy. See CULP ET
AL., supra, at 508. However, this should not be done through a scrotal incision, and great
care should be taken to avoid infection since this will necessitate removal of the implants.
See id.; Hermansen, supra, at 902.
Bilateral orchiectomies performed before puberty prevents the development of secon-
dary sex characteristics because of testosterone deficit. See MILLER & KEANE, ENCYCLO-
PEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, supra note 13, at 889. Replacement therapy may be
necessary to maintain a desirable level of the hormone. See id. If the procedure is done
after puberty, when the masculine characters have already developed, the effects are much
less extreme. See id.
A patient having an orchiectomy will have special needs, and may need assistance deal-
ing with problems related to his masculinity, self-concept and non-deviant sexual activity.
See id. The patient should be given time to think about and discuss the effects of surgical
castration. See id. The surgeon is generally responsible for informing the patient about the
procedure and its anticipated long-term effects. See id. at 890. The nurse and other health
care personnel can clarify any information that the patient and his family may have been
unable to assimilate during their conference with the surgeon. See id. All members of the
health care team should know the expected prognosis and be prepared to answer the pa-
tient's questions truthfully and matter-of-factly. See id. Given the extensive literature
available with respect to orchiectomies and the detailed care plan that accompanies such
procedures, it is clear that performing surgical castrations is not a novel undertaking with
unknown risks or effects.
112. See Bloom et al., supra note 23, at 153.
113. See Travin, Update, supra note 90, at 99.
114. See Wille & Beier, supra note 18, at 127-28.
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recidivism rates, with recidivism rates of non-castrates up to eighty per-
cent compared to as little as 2.2% for castrates, over periods of six
months to thirty years. 115 Another study indicated that only three per-
cent of persons who underwent surgical castration were involved in a sub-
sequent sex offense, while the sex reoffense rate for a non-castrate
control group was forty-six percent; subsequent rates for any reoffense
(including sex reoffense) were twenty-five percent among those castrates
and forty-three percent among non-castrates. 116 Reductions in sex reof-
fense rates such as these have led researchers to claim that castration is
very effective from a criminological point of view. 117
Surgical castration does have side effects, but this is true of pharmaco-
logic interventions for pedophilia as well; these may include: changes in
metabolic processes, loss of protein, augmentation of pituitary functions,
augmentation of kreatin found in urine, lowering of the hemoglobin per-
centage, changes in fat distribution in the body, diminution of the calcium
content of bones after a period of time, hot flashes and sweating, and
diminishment of beard and body hair.' 18 Additionally, castrates may ex-
hibit a number of mental effects that require consideration; these include
depressive reactions, suicidal tendencies, emotional lability, and indiffer-
ence to life. 119 However, due to the lack of comparable homogenous
study results, these mental effects are very much in dispute. 20
Those who oppose surgical castration for pedophiles and child molest-
ers do so for a variety of reasons. The overriding argument is that there is
no need to perform surgical castrations because it is clear that pharmaco-
logical means, such as cyproteronacetate and MPA treatments, may be
just as or more effective at reducing testosterone levels-and hence sex-
ual drive and sex offending-than surgical castration.121 Opponents of
surgical castration also argue that the operation is mutilating and carries
the distinct risk that it can be carried out coercively. 122 One commenta-
115. See Bradford, Organic Treatment, supra note 96, at 193-94; Fred S. Berlin,
Pedophilia: Driven By An Invisible Force, in PARTNERS IN CHANGE: GROWTH THROUGH
THE THERAPEUTIC (forthcoming).
116. See Wille & Beier, supra note 18, at 124-26.
117. See Van Zessen, supra note 61, at 190.
118. See Sturup, supra note 110, at 14-15.
119. See Wille & Beier, supra note 18, at 108.
120. See id.
121. See Treating Sexual Disorders with MPA: An Interview with Fred S. Berlin, 6 CUR-
RENTS IN AFFEcTIvE ILLNESS 5, 9 (1987) [hereinafter Interview with Berlin].
122. See Gunn, supra note 18, at 790; see generally infra Part IV.A. An additional argu-
ment that is that surgical castration for the treatment of sexual deviant behavior is just the
type of procedure for which a patient will be unable to provide consent, and that the proce-
dure is simply too experimental or innovative for medical and health professionals to per-
form on patients who are incarcerated. See, e.g., Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 220-21
(D. Md. 1979). The court in Bailey reviewed whether an inmate's constitutional rights
were violated by improper inducements offered regarding participation in a voluntary
medical research program, many of whose research procedures involved contagious dis-
eases. See id. at 204-05. The court took notice of the oft-referenced case of Kaimowitz v.
Dep't of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 101 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County July 31, 1973), in which
the capacity of involuntarily confined mental patients to consent to a psychosurgical proce-
dure on the brain was examined. See Bailey, 481 F. Supp. at 220 (citation omitted). The
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tor observes that there may be a case for surgical castration when psycho-
logical and behavioral programs fail, and when chemical suppression of
libido has been unsatisfactory, but that there is no overriding clinical rea-
son to proceed to surgery without first trying chemical suppressants. 123
However, two of the most notable castration studies undertaken-involv-
ing sex offenders in Denmark and Germany who voluntarily underwent
the procedure pursuant to laws specifically providing for such treat-
ment-bear close inspection.
The use of surgical castration as treatment for sexual disorders in the
country of Denmark is well-known and is instructive when considering
surgical castration in the context of treatment for pedophilic disorders in
this country. Denmark has been one of the few pioneers in permitting
sexual offenders to voluntarily undergo surgical castration, which has
been advocated as a treatment for sexual offenses for clearly forensic psy-
chiatric reasons. 124 Moreover, the use of voluntary castration in Den-
court in Bailey observed that the Kaimowitz court's focused on whether the psychosurgical
procedure in question was innovative or experimental, the procedure's intended use and
"uncertain benefit to the patient and society" (ameliorating anti-social behavior), the sub-
stantial danger, intrusiveness and irreversibility of the procedure, and the particularly vul-
nerable status of an involuntarily confined mental patient. See id. at 220-21 (citations
omitted). In finding no constitutional infirmities in the prison's research program, the
court in Bailey found that unlike the circumstances in Kaimowitz, the research program did
not involve uncertainties inherent in experimental procedures, nor were the research pro-
cedures "dangerous, intrusive, irreversible, [or] of uncertain benefit to the patient and to
society." Id. at 221 (citation omitted). The court observed that the diseases being
researched were well-known, that cures were easily administered, and that the doctors in-
volved testified that there was almost complete lack of danger to an inmate's life or future
health, and that only temporary illness and discomfort were involved. See id. Moreover,
the court found that great care was taken by the researchers to explain all the research
risks to the inmates who wished to participate in the research. See id.
In evaluating surgical castration in the context of the Bailey and Kaimowitz cases, it is
fairly obvious that surgical castration is not the type of procedure that runs a risk of being
found impermissible. First, surgical castration is not experimental or innovative, and the
disorder for which the procedure is intended to ameliorate is well-researched and docu-
mented. See supra Part II.B.2.c. and note 111. Second, the procedure's benefits to individ-
uals who suffer from pedophilia have been followed over many years involving many
individuals, and in reducing sex offense recidivism, benefit society as well. See supra Part
II.B.2.c. Third, the procedure is only minimally physically invasive with few risks, and the
care plan for castration is well-documented and cognizant of the special needs of patients
who undergo such procedures. See supra note 111. For these reasons, surgical castration
satisfies Kaimowitz-type concerns.
123. See Gunn, supra note 18, at 791.
124. See Sturup, supra note 110, at 11. Initially, Denmark created a committee to study
the criminal code; that committee concluded that castration could not be used as punish-
ment or as a substitute for punishment for sexual offenders. See id. at 12 (emphasis ad-
ded). The committee also found that voluntary castration could be permitted for
humanitarian reasons in cases where the person was unable to control his sexual urges and
was likely to resort to criminal means to satisfy them. See id. The committee proposed
legislation to permit castration with proper safeguards, namely a stipulation that persons
over 21 years of age, upon application, should be allowed to obtain permission for castra-
tion or other sexual intervention to their sexual organs, if their sexual drive, because of
abnormal strength or direction, placed them in danger of committing a crime such that
they represented a threat or danger to themselves or society. See id. The first law permit-
ting voluntary castration in Denmark went into effect in 1929; an amended version was
passed in 1935. See id. at 13; Ortmann, supra note 102, at 444-45. The law permitted the
castration of a person whose sexual drive entails considerable psychic sufferings or social
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mark has been considered both effective and successful. In a study of 900
castrates followed over a period of thirty years, asexualization resulted in
ninety-seven percent of the cases, while recidivism occurred in twenty
cases (a reoffense rate of 2.2%).125 Another study of 738 sexual offend-
ers castrated under Denmark law followed cases from 1929 through 1959,
and found that only ten of the castrated men relapsed into sexual crimi-
nality, a relapse rate of 1.4% after castration; if statistical variation is
taken into account because of the shorter follow-up time for some sub-
jects, the sex offense relapse rate in this second study is between 1.4%
and 2.4%.126 Thus, voluntary castration reduced the expected relapse
rate among sexual offenders from rates of up to fifty percent without cas-
tration, to reoffense rates of no more than three percent and probably
less than two percent.1 27 The Denmark experience in the field of reduc-
ing sex reoffense rates through castration has been confirmed by similar
findings in Germany (a recidivism rate of 1.1% among castrates), Norway
(a recidivism rate of 7.3% among castrates), Sweden (one recidivist out of
a study population of 307 castrates), Netherlands (a recidivism rate of
1.3% among castrates), and Switzerland (a recidivism rate of 7.2% among
castrates) 128
Observers of the Denmark castration scheme are satisfied that the pur-
poses of surgical intervention provided under Denmark law were
achieved.129 Specifically, there was a decrease in castrates' sexual drive,
with no significant physical or psychological damage to persons who un-
derwent castration.130 One researcher argues that a person who suffers
greatly as a result of his deviant sexual drive will, following castration,
experience significant relief at being freed from his deviant sexual
devaluation; it also included a provision for forced castration of very serious sexual
criminals, but since no forced castration was ever done, and that provision was deleted
from the law in 1967. See Sturup, supra note 110, at 13; Ortmann, supra note 102, at 445.
To obtain permission for a voluntary castration in Denmark, a sexual offender must first
establish his fear of committing a new sex offense, and it must be shown that such a possi-
bility is likely. See Sturup, supra note 110, at 18. Next, the possibility of relief through
castration is mentioned to the sexual offender, and the sexual offender and his treating
physician fully discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure. See id. The
sexual offender must then be given time to consider his decision even if his decision has
probably already been made. See id. If the sexual offender chooses castration, he files his
application for the procedure, which requests permission for the castration, with the appro-
priate governmental agency, which reviews the sexual offender's complete history and psy-
chiatric evaluation and rules on the request. See id. The surgery must be done by a
specially authorized surgeon; the patient is hospitalized for a few days and released into
the population in 10 to 14 days. See id. Castration is never advised unless it is medically
indicated and is part of a total treatment plan. See id. at 19. The treatment is designed to
make life more bearable for the offender and to reduce the risk of relapse. See id. The
main effect of castration on men with serious sexual difficulties is that their capacity to
respond to sexual stimuli is diminished, as is their sexual fantasy life, and their sexual
interests in general. See id. at 17.
125. See Sturup, supra note 110, at 13, 14.
126. See Ortmann, supra note 102, at 445.
127. See id.; Sturup, supra note 110, at 13-14, 16.
128. See Sturup, supra note 110, at 16.




urges.' 3 ' Another commentator argues that as long as more effective
medical treatment is unavailable, voluntary castration should not be de-
nied to sexual offenders who, after being carefully advised, choose to be
relieved of their suffering through the procedure. 132 Another indication
of the success of Denmark's castration program is demonstrated by the
follow-up responses of castrates-more than ninety percent of whom in-
dicated that they were satisfied with their operation.133
A few caveats over the Denmark's castration scheme deserve mention.
First, only 4.4% of all Danish male sexual offenders recorded during the
period of 1929 to 1939 were considered suitable candidates for the proce-
dure and ultimately underwent castration. 34 Second, in later years, the
number of sex offenders who underwent castration under the law steadily
declined; since 1972, no sexual offender in Denmark has undergone cas-
tration. 135 One possible explanation for the decrease in the voluntary
castration rate is that some physicians are reluctant to recommend this
operation because of its side effects, and increasingly, because many phy-
sicians believe that similarly effective results in reducing sex offending
behavior are obtained through biological and pharmacological
treatment.13
6
An important and more recent study of orchiectomies involves sex of-
fenders in Germany. Orchiectomy for sex offenders in Germany is volun-
tary; sex offenders apply to a "castration committee," of which there is
one in each federal state in Germany-consisting of two physicians and
one lawyer.137 One physician must examine the applicant, and the castra-
tion committee considers whether the benefits of orchiectomy outweigh
the harms as well as the chances of success with alternative treatments. 138
An important consideration to the castration committee is the extent to
which castration will assist the applicant cope with life in the community,
as well as prevent further sex offenses. 139 Despite its legal permissibility,
castration is by no means common in Germany, and is becoming even less
so. Between 1970 and 1980, 400 sex offenders underwent castrations, out
of a total of 770 applicants; 140 between 1980 and 1989, only about five
applicants underwent castration each year, out of approximately 5000
persons convicted of various sex offenses. 141
The German study involved 104 castrates,' as well as fifty-three non-
castrates who had previously applied for castration under the German
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 14-15.
134. See Ortmann, supra note 102, at 445.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 445-46; see also supra Part II.B.2.a.







law. 142 Based upon a collection of personal observations, interviews, in-
spection of files, case histories, and prison records, researchers in the
study came up with several noteworthy findings. For instance, the re-
searchers found that all 104 castrates showed reduced sexual interest and
activity, reduced erotic fantasies, and reduced capability of spontaneous
or stimulated erections. 143 About twenty-five percent of castrates were
capable of intercourse after three years, and twenty percent after five
years-although at greater intervals between intercourse, and only after
intensive stimulation. 44 In some cases, libido and erection returned to
pre-operative level within six months. 145
Another significant finding from the German study was that the most
dramatically changed variable from the time of application for castration
to the follow-up investigation after castration was the subject's place of
abode. 146 Significantly more non-castrated applicants than castrates re-
mained in penal institutions or psychiatric hospitals; significantly more
castrates than non-castrates had residences in private apartments. 147 A
total of 70.2% of castrates lived in an abode of their own at follow-up,
compared to just 8.7% prior to application for castration. 148 The study
did note, however, that even non-castrates showed some improvements in
their living situations, possibly due to aging and to the help of social
workers and probation officers. 149
The results of the German study clearly suggest a relationship between
castration and recidivism rates for sex offenses. 150 Both sexual and non-
sexual offenses recorded in criminal records-as well as sexual offenses
discovered by researchers but unknown to police or which had not led to
conviction-were examined to reveal the effects of castration on recidi-
vism.' 51 The follow-up investigation revealed that three percent of cas-
trates had been involved in sex offenses and twenty-five percent in non-
sex offenses, compared to forty-six percent of non-castrates involved in
sex offenses and forty-three percent in non-sex crimes. 52 A total of
twenty-five percent of castrated men recidivated in some form as op-
posed to seventy-four percent of the non-castrated group. 153 Further sta-
tistical analysis revealed that the difference between recidivism of
castrates and non-castrates was only significant for sex offenses, however,
and not for non-sex crimes. 154
142. See id.
143. See id. at 127.
144. See id. at 128.
145. See id. at 127.
146. See id. at 121.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 120, 122.
149. See id. at 122.
150. See id. at 125.
151. See id. at 113, 125.





Lastly, 71.4% of castrates evaluated were pleased with their situation
following castration, while 19.5% were undecided and 9.1% were dissatis-
fied.155 The castrates were apparently not given prosthetic implants, and
the study's authors state that the greatest impairment to the castrates'
masculinity was their empty scrota. 156 This may account for some of the
dissatisfaction felt by some of the castrates. However, all men involved
reported surprise at the understanding shown by their female partners.157
In sum, there is clear and uncontroverted evidence that surgical castra-
tion as a therapeutic intervention for persons who have pedophilic disor-
ders is effective, both with respect to reduced libido and sexual activity
and, importantly, reduced sex offending. While castration does have side
effects, this is also true for alternatives such as pharmacologic regimes.
And while castration may no longer be practiced in Denmark, one of the
countries studied, this is because chemical interventions are now the
treatment of choice, not because castration has been found ineffective.
For purposes of providing a clinically appropriate means for providing
relief from what is a debilitating and life-long disorder, surgical castration
simply cannot be discounted. Recent legislation supports this position.
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO SEX OFFENDERS WHO
VICTIMIZE CHILDREN
The response among state legislatures to sex offenses involving child
victims has been divergent. Four recently enacted examples of these re-
sponses bear examination: California Assembly Bill 3339, signed into law
in 1996;158 Montana Senate Bill 31 and House Bill 268,- a compromise of
earlier bills that were vetoed by Montana Governor Racicot, but whose
vetoes were overridden; 159 Florida House Bill 83, which became effective
for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1997; and Texas Senate Bill
123, entitled "An Act Relating to the Treatment of Repeat Sex Offend-
ers," signed into law in May 1997.160 All four laws expressly sanction
surgical castration for persons convicted of specified sex offenses involv-
ing child victims, but in ways and with purposes that vary significantly. 161
155. See id. at 128.
156. See id.; cf. CULP ET AL., supra note 111 (indicating that a normal-looking scrotum
can be obtained with implants).
157. See Wille & Beier, supra note 18, at 128.
158. See Act of Sep. 17, 1996, ch. 596, § 2, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2711 (West) (codified
as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West Supp. 1997)); see also Bill Kisliuk,
Broadman Weighs in on Chemical Castration, THE RECORDER, Jan. 9, 1997, at 1.
159. See Act of Apr. 19, 1997, ch. 334, § 2, 1997 Mont. Laws H.B. 268 (to be codified as
amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (1997)).
160. See Act of May 5, 1997, 75th Legs. R.S., ch. 144, §§ 1-5, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
287 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 501.061-.062;
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(h), art. 42.12, § 11(f), art. 42.18, § 8(s)).
161. See infra Parts III.A.-C.
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A. CALIFORNIA'S ASSEMBLY BILL 3339 REGARDING THE
PENAL CODE
California Assembly Bill 3339 (A.B. 3339) reworks Section 645 of the
state's Penal Code, 162 which had permitted courts to impose sterilization
for the purpose of preventing procreation upon persons who were con-
victed of specified sex offenses against female victims under the age of
ten years. 163 In its place, the revamped section 645 provides instead that
courts may impose medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment (com-
monly but inaccurately referred to as "chemical castration") as punish-
ment upon persons who are convicted of their first specified sex
offense 164 against a victim under the age of thirteen years.165 The new
law does not indicate under what circumstances a court "may"' 66 impose
MPA treatment upon offenders who are convicted for the first time of
one or more of the specific sex offenses. The law is silent regarding per-
sons convicted of their third or subsequent offense. However, the court is
required to impose MPA treatment as punishment upon persons who are
convicted of a second such offense. 167 The law does not set a minimum
age limit for a convict subject to MPA treatment, with the result that a
person of any age convicted of one or more of the enumerated offenses is
subject to such treatment. Under section 645, MPA treatment shall com-
mence one week prior to the offender's release from prison or other state
institution, and continues until the California Department of Corrections
demonstrates to the state's Board of Prison Terms that MPA treatment
for the parolee is no longer necessary. 168 Conceivably, such treatment
could be lifelong. A physician or surgeon who is an employee of the de-
partment may not be forced to participate unwillingly in MPA treat-
ment.169 Section 645 directs the California Department of Corrections to
implement protocols "required" under the new law, the only statutorily
specified requirement being that the offender be informed "about the ef-
fect of hormonal chemical treatment and any side effects that may result
from it.' 170 Significantly, an offender who voluntarily undergoes a "per-
manent, surgical alternative" (an orchiectomy) to MPA treatment is not
otherwise subject to the new law. 17 1 This provision may serve to induce
162. See Act of Sept. 1, 1996, ch. 596, § 2, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2711 (West) (codified as
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West Supp. 1998)).
163. This version of § 645 was repealed and replaced upon the enactment of A.B. 3339,
§8 1-2, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess., 1997 Cal. Lesis. Serv. 2711 (West). See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 645 (West Supp. 1998).
164. The specified sex offenses include lewd & lascivious acts; oral copulation; sodomy;
and penetration by a foreign object where the victim is under 13 years of age. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 645(c)(1)-(4) (1996). For a description of MPA treatment, see supra note
91.
165. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(a) (West Supp. 1997).
166. See id.
167. See id. § 645(b).
168. See id. § 645(d).
169. See id. § 645(f).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 645(e).
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offenders to undergo surgical castration, given the prospect of life-long
MPA treatment and consequent life-long parole supervision.
Section 645 makes no pretense of the fact that the imposition of MPA
treatment upon offenders convicted of specified sex offenses is consid-
ered punishment. 172 The language of the new law and the role of courts
in applying the law to convicted sex offenders clearly establish the new
law's punitive objective. 173 The characterization of MPA treatment as
punishment, together with the lack of any reference to the use of profes-
sional medical judgment as the basis for initiating, continuing, or discon-
tinuing MPA treatment, is important: this characterization subjects the
law to analysis under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.174
Had MPA been characterized under section 645 as treatment, and at-
tended by the usual considerations-such as the need for treatment, risks
and benefits, and the like-the law would less likely be subject to an
Eighth Amendment analysis altogether.175 Although the legislative anal-
ysis underlying section 645 states that MPA treatment has been shown to
lower testosterone levels in males and that such drugs serve to suppress
sexual offending, particularly among pedophiles, section 645 does not re-
quire that persons convicted of sex offenses suffer from the types of
paraphilic disorders for which MPA treatment is considered clinically ap-
propriate. 176 Moreover, the law does not require that a particularized
finding be made by medical and health professionals with respect to spe-
cific offenders upon whom MPA treatment will be imposed that such
treatment is medically appropriate and clinically indicated. 177 Conceiva-
bly then, MPA treatment could be imposed upon an individual for whom
such treatment is clinically inappropriate and even dangerous. Finally,
there is no indication in the law or its legislative history that a "perma-
nent, surgical alternative" may for some persons be more effective than
MPA treatment, 178 with the result that some persons may feel compelled
to undergo surgical castration simply to escape the long-term supervision
possible with MPA treatment, even if surgical castration may not be ap-
propriate for that individual. Requirements such as these are the types of
questions that clearly call for professional medical judgment and that, in
cases involving constitutional challenges to state laws that permit involun-
tary medical treatment, have generally served to insulate medical deci-
sion-making under these laws from court scrutiny.179 The lack of such
172. See id. § 645(a), (b).
173. See id.
174. See infra Part IV.A. (examining the contours of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence).
175. See infra Part IV.B. (examining how medical treatment schemes have fared under
Eighth Amendment analysis).
176. See Sex Offenders: Chemical Castration, Hearing on A.B. 3339 Before the Senate
Rules Comm., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Hearing].
177. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West Supp. 1998).
178. Id.; Hearing, supra note 176.
179. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231-33 (1990). In Harper, a state
prisoner challenged a prison policy that authorized involuntary treatment with anti-
psychotic drugs if certain substantive and procedural components were met as violative of
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findings in section 645 and its failure to require that such findings be
made prior to imposing MPA treatment upon offenders suggest that sec-
tion 645 will not receive the traditional court deference accorded to pro-
fessional medical judgment, thus leaving section 645 more vulnerable to
constitutional challenge.'80
B. MONTANA SENATE BILL 31
Montana Senate Bill 31 (S.B. 31), passed into law on April 19, 1997, on
an override of the Governor's veto, provides that persons convicted of
certain offenses "may ... be sentenced" to undergo MPA treatment in
addition to sentencing imposed under current law.'81 These offenses in-
clude first time offenses for sexual assault, sexual intercourse without
consent, or incest, where the victim is less than sixteen years old and the
offender is three or more years older than the victim.182 Also included
are any of the above offenses, regardless of the victim's age, where the
the Due Process Clause of both the Federal and Washington State Constitutions. The in-
mate was initially diagnosed by prison psychiatrists as suffering from a manic-depressive
disorder and later as schizophrenia. See id. at 214. For several months after being incarcer-
ated, he voluntarily consented to the administration of anti-psychotic drugs, but in Novem-
ber 1982, he refused to continue taking the medications. See id. Pursuant to a prison
policy, the treating physician sought to involuntarily administer the prescribed medications
to the inmate. See id.
The policy provided that an inmate could be involuntarily treated if he: "(1) suffers from
a 'mental disorder' and (2) is 'gravely disabled' or poses a 'likelihood of serious harm' to
himself, others, or their property." Id. at 215. In addition, the inmate was entitled to a
hearing before a special committee, which was comprised of a psychiatrist, psychologist,
and the Associate Superintendent of the Special Offender Center, none of whom could be
involved in the treatment or diagnosis of the inmate at the time of the hearing. See id. At
the hearing, the inmate had "the right to attend; to present evidence, including witnesses;
to cross-examine staff witnesses; and to the assistance of a lay adviser who has not been
involved in his case and who understands the psychiatric issues involved." Id. at 216. The
inmate was also entitled to certain procedural rights, including at least 24 hours' notice of
the Center's intent to seek involuntary medication of the inmate, as well as notice of his
tentative diagnosis, the facts supporting that diagnosis, and the reasons why medication is
believed to be necessary. See id. A right to appeal'the committee's decision to the Center
Superintendent and then to seek judicial review was also available to the inmate. See id.
The Court held that while Harper had a liberty interest conferred by both state law and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the prison's policy nonetheless
satisfied both the Clause's procedural and substantive requirements. See id. at 221-23. The
Court concluded that "[t]he extent of a prisoner's right.., to avoid the unwanted adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate's confinement."
Id. at 222. Viewed in this light, the Court held that the procedural protections established
by the policy were sufficient to ensure that the decision to administer anti-psychotic drugs
to the inmate was not made arbitrarily or erroneously and that a judicial hearing was not
required as the Washington Supreme Court had held. See id. at 228. Most importantly, the
Court indicated that the policy's delegation of the decision to medical professionals was
perhaps preferable than having it made by a judge who, the Court thought, may not appre-
ciate and appropriately balance the potential side-effects of the medication and the in-
mate's interest in avoiding forced medication with the governmental interests at stake. See
id. at 229-33.
180. See supra note 176; See, e.g., infra Parts IV.A.-B.
181. See Act of Apr. 19, 1997, ch. 334, 52, 1997 Mont. Laws H.B. 268n (codified as
amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (1997)).




offender inflicts bodily harm upon the victim in the course of committing
the offense. 183 The provisions under S.B. 31 also apply to persons con-
victed of second or subsequent offenses for sexual assault where the vic-
tim is aged less than sixteen years and the offender is three or more years
older than the victim, as well as sexual intercourse without consent or
incest regardless of the victim's age.184
Like California, Montana's S.B. 31 characterizes MPA or its chemical
equivalent as punishment. 185 The treatment is imposed by a court upon
the applicable offender and commences one week prior to the offender's
release from confinement. 186 Treatment is administered by the Montana
Department of Corrections or its agent and is paid for by the state.1 87
Treatment continues until the Department of Corrections determines that
treatment is no longer necessary, which, of course, could conceivably be
life-long. 188 In terms of safeguards, S.B. 31 requires that the offender be
"fully medically informed" of the treatment's effects;189 professional
medical employees of the department may not be compelled against their
wishes to administer any treatment under S.B. 31.190
However, unlike California, at no time are Montana courts required to
impose MPA treatment; the decision to order MPA treatment or its
chemical equivalent is entirely within the court's discretion. 19' Nonethe-
less, an offender's failure to continue the treatment as ordered by a court
constitutes criminal contempt, in which case the court is required to im-
pose a prison term of not less than ten years but not more than 100
years. 192 Offenders who are not sentenced to undergo MPA or its chemi-
cal equivalent may volunteer to undergo such treatment or surgical cas-
tration, in which case the treatment or castration must be administered by
the Department of Corrections or its agent and paid for by the depart-
ment, although the timing of the treatment or its duration is not speci-
fied. 193 For reasons similar to those discussed regarding California Penal
Code section 645, S.B. 31 does not represent the type of involuntary med-
ical treatment statute under which decisions regarding medical treatment
are accorded deference by courts. 194 For this reason, S.B. 31 is vulnerable
to constitutional challenge.195
Interestingly, a later amendment to S.B. 31, Montana House Bill 268
(H.B. 268), amended the language of S.B. 31 by inserting the terms,
183. See id.
184. See id. § 45-5-512(2).
185. See id. § 45-5-512(1)-(3).
186. See id. § 45-5-512(4).
187. See id. § 45-5-512(1)-(3).
188. See id. § 45-5-512(4).
189. Id. § 45-5-512(5).
190. See id. § 45-5-512(6).
191. See id. § 45-5-512(1)-(3) (stating that a convicted person "may ... be sentenced to
undergo [MPA] treatment").
192. See id. § 45-5-512(4).
193. See id. § 45-5-512(3).
194. See supra Part III.A.
195. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.
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"medically safe," before the terms "MPA treatment. ' 196 H.B. 268 also
amended the language of S.B. 31 by inserting the terms "or other medi-
cally safe drug treatment" after the terms "chemical equivalent. '197 The
amending language appears to prohibit any MPA treatment or its chemi-
cal equivalent that poses a medical risk to the offender. Whether treat-
ment posing only the slightest risk, a reasonable risk, or a substantial risk
is prohibited is not specified. The resulting ambiguity raises the strange
possibility that no such treatment can be imposed or administered since
these treatments pose at least some risk. It also is not clear who deter-
mines whether treatment is "medically safe," (e.g., the courts, the depart-
ment, or the medical professionals), or whether courts may resentence
offenders for whom MPA treatment or its chemical equivalent poses a
medical risk and for whom such treatment is prohibited. Furthermore, it
is unclear whether, in the event such treatment is deemed unsafe by a
medical professional, a court that imposed the treatment is compelled to
recognize such a medical finding and to forego forcible treatment. Thus,
while the provisions of S.B. 31 and H.B. 268 are drafted to ensure that
only medically safe treatment is imposed or permitted-an obvious im-
provement over California H.B. 3339-ambiguous language in the Mon-
tana laws raise some potentially troublesome issues.
C. FLORIDA HOUSE BILL 83
Florida House Bill 83 (H.B. 83), which became effective May 30, 1997,
for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1997, is similar to Califor-
nia's A.B. 3339 in that a Florida court may (for a first offense) or must
(for a subsequent offense) impose MPA treatment as part of a sentence
upon a defendant who is convicted of sexual battery under chapter
794.011 of the Florida Statutes.1 98 Thus, the same troubling issues raised
by the California law apply here as well.
H.B. 83 is clearly a punitive response to sexual offending: only courts
are authorized to direct or order MPA treatment or physical castration of
an offender; additionally, the offender's failure or refusal to undergo
MPA treatment is itself an additional felony.199 This may not be so re-
markable since the law is intended to address sex crimes in particular, and
not sexual paraphilias in general. For the same reason, it is not remarka-
ble that the new law does not set a lower age limit, with the result that a
196. H.B. 268, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1997 Mont. Laws 341, § 2(2)(A) (codified as
amended at MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512(a)(A) (1997)).
197. Id. § 45-5-512(2)(B)-(C).
198. H.B. 83, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235 (West
Supp. 1998)). Sexual battery under chapter 794.011 of the Florida Statutes is defined as
"oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the
anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object ....... FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.011(1)(h) (West 1996). The offense is a capital felony if committed by a person 18
years of age or older upon a person who is less than 12 years of age, or a life felony if
committed by a person less than 18 years of age upon a person who is less than 12 years of
age. Id. at § (2)(a), (b).
199. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235(1), (5)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1998).
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person of any age convicted of the specified offense could be subjected to
MPA treatment.
Under H.B. 83, MPA treatment is to commence no later than one week
prior to the offender's release from prison or other institution.200 MPA
treatment may not be imposed in lieu of, or reduce, any other penalty
provided for by the sexual battery statute.201 The court must also specify
the duration of treatment for a term of years, which may-if the court so
chooses-require that the offender undergo MPA treatment for life.202
However, H.B. 83 provides that "[n]othing contained in this section shall
be construed to require the continued administration of [MPA treatment]
when it is not medically appropriate. '2 0 3 MPA treatment is to be pro-
vided by the state Department of Corrections.204
However, unlike the California law but somewhat similar to Montana's
S.B. 31, MPA treatment under H.B. 83 is contingent upon a court-ap-
pointed medical expert's finding that the defendant is an appropriate can-
didate for MPA treatment.20 5 This language appears to reflect some
concern that imposing mandatory MPA treatment be validated by medi-
cal expertise, as well as the concern that MPA treatment is not suitable
for all offenders convicted of sexual battery. Unfortunately, H.B. 83 does
not define what is meant by "court-appointed medical expert," such as
whether the expert should simply be a licensed physician or other practi-
tioner, or whether the expert should have demonstrated expertise specific
to MPA or other related treatment, sexual paraphilias, sexual violence, or
criminality. Given the divergence of opinion on treatment responses for
paraphilias and the level of expertise required to render sex offender
treatment programs successful,206 more specificity with respect to who
may serve as a court appointed medical expert may be warranted.
Additionally, H.B. 83 does not clearly indicate what is meant by "ap-
propriate candidate. o20 7 Thus, it is not known whether, for example, the
medical expert must personally examine the defendant or may base his or
her determination on who is an appropriate candidate on medical
records, or may make such a determination on no medical records at all.
Nor is it clear that the defendant must evidence a particular paraphilic
disorder for which MPA is considered an appropriate treatment response,
or whether a conviction for sexual battery will suffice to establish the
presence of such a disorder, before the defendant is considered an appro-
priate candidate for MPA treatment. Moreover, it is not known whether
the term "appropriate candidate" is meant to include only defendants for
whom it is established that MPA poses no unacceptable risk given the
200. See id. § 794.0235(2)(b).
201. See id. § 794.0235(i).
202. See id. § 794.0235(2)(a).
203. See id. § 794.0235(3).
204. See id.
205. See id. § 794.0235(2)(a).
206. See supra Part II.B.
207. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235(2)(a) (West. Supp. 1998).
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defendant's circumstances, regardless of whether MPA would be of any
use. An additional uncertainty is whether the term "appropriate candi-
date" means a defendant that is competent to make treatment decisions.
This uncertainty is significant because it is possible that some defendants,
incompetent or not, would rather refuse MPA treatment and incur a fel-
ony offense penalty, and restricting the term "appropriate candidate" to
only competent defendants would appear to be unfairly restrictive.
More ambiguities are raised by the terms: "[n]othing contained in this
section shall be construed to require the continued administration of
medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment when it is not medically
appropriate.'20 8 For example, it is not clear who shall make this post-
sentencing determination, 20 9 on what basis, 210 and whether alternative
treatment will be offered. 211 The lack of clarity or the defining of key
terms in the language of H.B. 83 are especially troubling given that the
clinical knowledge and experience with respect to the use of chemical or
biologic agents such as MPA for the treatment of paraphilias is both ex-
tensive as well as varied, and that-had the provisions been more well-
defined to incorporate this knowledge and experience-could have at
least served to help ensure that any treatment provided pursuant to the
law is not inconsistent with current treatment practices for sexual
paraphilias.212
For purposes of our discussion, H.B. 83 is also significant because, simi-
lar to California's A.B. 3339 and Montana's S.B. 31, a defendant may
voluntarily undergo surgical castration. 213 Under H.B. 83, the defendant
may accomplish this by requesting the sentencing court, upon motion, to
order the defendant to undergo "physical castration" as an alternative
penalty to MPA treatment. 214 Castration under this law may be ordered
on the condition that the defendant's consent to undergo physical castra-
tion is "intelligent, knowing, and voluntary. '215 Based upon this lan-
guage, H.B. 83's sponsors and the legislature appear to have some
concerns about permitting courts to order involuntarily castration or per-
mitting castration to be performed in the absence of the offender's
consent.
The provision for consent also appears to reflect some important ele-
ments of the standard for informed consent generally required in any
208. Id. § 794.0235(3) (emphasis added).
209. See id. § 794.0235(2)(a) (providing that a court appointed medical expert shall
make such a determination at the time of sentencing).
210. Such as, for example, whether MPA treatment poses unacceptable risks that were
not known at the time of sentencing; the offender fails after a period of time to benefit
from MPA treatment; or the offender is no longer competent to consent to continued
treatment.
211. See supra Part II.B.2. for examples of alternative treatment for sexual paraphilias.
212. See id.





medical treatment context, but is clearly not the equivalent. 21 6 Adding to
H.B. 83's already ambiguous language is the fact that nowhere in the law
is it specified that a candidate for castration receive the same considera-
tion for "appropriate" treatment that is required for a defendant subject
to MPA treatment.217 Such an omission might arguably be interpreted as
a willingness on the state's part to condone surgical castration as a puni-
tive response to sexual offending, without any regard as to whether cas-
tration has any therapeutic benefit. Removing castration even further
from a therapeutic context and closer to a punitive one, H.B. 83 fails to
indicate-as it does indicate for MPA treatment-who may perform cas-
tration, or under what conditions castration may be undertaken. These
omissions, together with H.B. 83's ambiguous language regarding both
MPA treatment and castration, create conditions that inevitably give rise
to legal challenges, 218 rendering H.B. 83, in this respect, similar to Cali-
fornia's A.B. 3339 and Montana's S.B. 31.
D. TEXAS SENATE BILL 123
Texas Senate Bill 123, An Act Relating to the Treatment of Repeat Sex
Offenders (S.B. 123)-permitting physicians to perform surgical castra-
tion (also called an "orchiectomy") upon certain inmates-amends the
216. For a general discussion of the history of the informed consent doctrine and the
substantive requirements for informed consent, see Emidio A. Bianco & Harold L. Hirsh,
Consent To and Refusal of Medical Treatment, in LEGAL MEDICINE: LEGAL DYNAMICS OF
MEDICAL ENCOUNTERS (American College of Legal Medicine ed., 1995). See also Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779-83, 786-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Canterbury is a widely cited
case that reflects the legal standard for informed consent in the majority of jurisdictions.
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 337-40
(1991).
In Canterbury, the issue was, in part, whether the appellee-defendant physician was neg-
ligent for failing to inform the appellant-patient prior to undergoing a laminectomy (surgi-
cal procedure involving excision of the posterior arch of the vertebra) of the risk of
paralysis associated with the procedure. 464 F.2d at 776, 778. The appellant-plaintiff's
claim was based upon the physician's duty to disclose relevant information to his or her
patient about the options and risks associated with a given treatment plan. See id. at 780,
781-82. The court followed its recitation of the litigation's history with a review of the
history of holding physicians responsible for "satisfying the vital informational needs of the
patient." Id. at 779-84. In reversing the lower court and finding for the appellant-patient,
the court went beyond reaffirming the physician's duty to disclose and undertook the task
of developing some substantive requirements of the physician's duty. See id. at 779. The
court observed that, despite the fact that courts have frequently been confronted with the
scope of the duty, "no uniform standard defining the adequacy of the divulgence emerges
from the decisions." Id. at 786. The court began this analysis by observing that the "pa-
tient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the [physician's] duty to reveal" and
that the scope of the required disclosure "must be measured by the patient's need, and that
need is the information material to the [patient's] decision." Id. Based upon these obser-
vations, the court stated the scope of the duty to disclose is not subjective as to the physi-
cian or the patient, and that "a risk is ... material when a reasonable person, in what the
physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy." Id. at 787 (citation omitted). Topics of disclosure include inherent and potential
hazards associated with proposed treatment, any alternatives to the proposed treatment,
and the results likely to ensue if the patient were to forego treatment. Id. at 787-88.
217. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235(2)(a) (West Supp. 1998).
218. See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of these possible legal challenges.
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Texas Government Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure and was
signed into law on May 20, 1997.219 Under S.B. 123, only prison inmates
who have been twice convicted for indecency, sexual assault, or aggra-
vated sexual assault involving a child younger than seventeen years are
eligible to undergo surgical castration.220 There are several provisions in
S.B. 123 that, unlike the California and Montana laws discussed previ-
ously, are clearly intended to ensure that surgical castration is a volun-
tary, non-coercive, and clearly therapeutic undertaking.
First and foremost, S.B. 123 is entirely divorced from any penal objec-
tive whatsoever, minimizing any potential coercive influence over the of-
fender's decision to voluntarily undergo castration. Judges are expressly
prohibited from requiring defendants to undergo surgical castration as a
condition of community supervision, and parole boards may not require
inmates to undergo surgical castration as a condition of parole or release
to mandatory supervision. 221 Moreover, before sentencing, neither the
state nor the defendant may offer into evidence the fact that the defend-
ant plans to undergo surgical castration.22 2 This further minimizes any
possible inducement-such as reduced sentencing or probation in lieu of
sentencing-for the offender to undergo castration. In essence, an of-
fender's decision to undergo surgical castration assumes no penal
significance.
Second, other provisions in S.B. 123 are intended to ensure that the
decision to permit inmates to voluntarily undergo castration is clearly
therapeutically driven. For example, the inmate must be at least twenty-
one years of age and must request a surgical castration in writing.223 The
physician who is to perform the surgical castration must first obtain "the
inmate's informed, written consent to undergo the procedure. ' 224 Addi-
tionally, a psychiatrist and a psychologist who have experience in treating
sex offenders must evaluate the inmate and find that the inmate is a "suit-
able candidate for the procedure," as well as counsel the inmate before
the procedure. 225 Furthermore, a "monitor" with experience in mental
health, law, and ethics must also consult with the inmate-after the in-
mate has provided informed consent to undergo castration and has been
evaluated by a psychiatrist and psychologist-to ensure that the inmate
has actually been adequately informed about the procedure, or to provide
the inmate with such information, as well as to determine that the inmate
is free of coercion in the inmate's decision to undergo surgical castra-
219. See Act of May 5, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 144, §§ 1-5, 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
287 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 501.061-.062;
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(h), art. 42.12, § 11(f), art. 42.18, § 8(5)).
220. See id. § 1(a)(1); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 21.11, 22.011(a)(2), 22.021(a)(2)(B)
(Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1997).
221. See id. §§ 3, 4.
222. See id. § 2.
223. See id. § 1(a)(2) to (3) (amending TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 501.061).
224. Id. § 1(a)(6).
225. Id. § 1(a)(5).
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tion.2 2 6 In the event the monitor determines that an inmate who elects to
undergo surgical castration is not free of coercive influence, the monitor
has a legal obligation to advise the inmate to withdraw the inmate's re-
quest for surgical castration.227 S.B. 123 also requires that psychiatric or
psychological examinations be provided to the inmate for a period of at
least ten years following castration. It also requires that longitudinal
studies and monitoring of inmates are undertaken, in part to compare the
relapse rates of sex offending behavior between inmates who undergo
surgical castration and those who do not.22 8
Statutory restrictions that expressly bar any penal association with an
inmate's decision to seek surgical castration and other restrictions (e.g.,
age, written, voluntary requests from inmates, written informed consent,
psychiatric and psychological evaluations, consultation by a monitor on
issues of consent and coercion, and follow-up evaluations and studies)
provide a level of precaution that is simply unprecedented for obtaining
medical treatment. Given the various concerns expressed about surgical
castration for the treatment of pedophilic disorders, at least in the United
States, such heightened precautions are appropriate; at a minimum, the
presence of such precautions demonstrates that, unlike the California,
Montana, and Florida laws, Texas's S.B. 123 cannot be characterized as
punitive. In sum, S.B. 123 lacks the legal infirmities that are apparent in
the California, Montana, and Florida laws upon which legal challenges
are sure to materialize.
IV. SURGICAL CASTRATION AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Although clinical evidence suggests that surgical castration is effective
in reducing testosterone levels-and, hence, the frequently debilitating
impulse to engage in behavior that may result in sex offenses229-the per-
formance of a surgical castration upon incarcerated chronic pedophiles by
physicians employed or retained by government officials is quite likely to
be challenged or criticized as cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This should come as no
surprise, since the history of castration is marked chiefly by abuse and
injustice:230 castration was used on slaves and captives of war,231 and was
widely practiced in Nazi Germany as a compulsory punitive procedure
for sex offenders.232 In the early part of this century, castration as a crim-
226. See id. § 1(f).
227. See id. § 1(f)(4).
228. See id. § 1(a), (b) (amending TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 501.062). These proce-
dures are in accord with, and even exceed, the "special needs" considerations that should
be addressed by health care professionals with their patients who undergo castration. See
MILLER & KEANE, supra note 13.
229. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
230. See infra Part IV.A.
231. See William L. Baker, Comment, Castration of the Male Sexual Offender: A Le-
gally Impermissible Alternative, 30 Loy. L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1984).
232. See id. at 379; see also Wille & Beier, supra note 18, at 105.
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inal penalty in the U.S. fell almost exclusively upon minority groups.233
Given this history, later courts have included castration of prisoners in
the class of punishments prohibited as cruel and unusual.234 Therefore, it
is highly improbable that as a method of punishment, castration would
ever find judicial acceptance in the future.
However, an orchiectomy performed for a purely therapeutic purpose
is an entirely different proposition and not unprecedented: surgical cas-
tration for sexual disorders is still practiced in Europe,235 and is per-
formed on patients with testicular or prostate cancer in the U.S. 2 36
Evidence from these cases and other research provide compelling evi-
dence that castration reduces libido and sexual activity, and, in turn, sex-
ual paraphilias that often result in sexual offending.237  Used
therapeutically, surgical castration may very well survive a constitutional
"cruel and unusual punishment" challenge, provided that in each particu-
lar case the decision to undergo surgical castration is made voluntarily by
the inmate, that the inmate is free from coercion in the inmate's decision
to undergo castration, and that surgical castration is clinically indi-
cated.238 Absent such conditions, orchiectomy should be eschewed and
rightly prohibited.239
A. CASTRATION AS PUNISHMENT
The U.S. Supreme Court defines punishment as a "deliberate act in-
tended to chastise or deter. '240 The term has been used by courts to de-
scribe not only the obvious types of punishment (which are usually
imposed by sentencing courts), such as execution, terms of imprisonment,
probation, fines, and community service, but may also include less obvi-
ous manifestations such as failure to provide medical treatment, failure to
protect vulnerable inmates from harm, solitary confinement, hard labor,
mandatory treatment for disorders that may manifest in risk or harm to
self or even others, and reduced privileges (e.g., shower, exercise and visi-
tation) that are usually imposed by correctional authorities. 241
233. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 482 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); United
States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 774 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, Clary v. U.S., 513 U.S. 1182 (1995).
234. See infra Part IV.A.
235. See Wille & Beier, supra note 18, at 105.
236. See id.
237. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
238. See infra Parts IV.B. & C.
239. Most states have their own constitutional provisions that prohibit cruel and unu-
sual, or cruel or unusual, punishments that are derived directly from the common law and
generally mirror the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 319-20 (1972).
240. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991).
241. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (death penalty, fines, hard labor);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (failure to provide medical care); Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (failure to protect vulnerable inmate from other assault-




There are, however, limits on the extent to which persons convicted of
crimes may punished. The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. '242 The Eighth
Amendment applies to states, and therefore to state prisons, through the
Fourteenth Amendment.243 Generally, early Eighth Amendment law-
suits, as well as lawsuits brought under similar "cruel and unusual" provi-
sions found in state constitutions, involve challenges to the punishments
that were imposed. For example, prisoners argued that the sentence
length imposed upon them was disproportionate to the crimes that the
prisoners committed or that certain punishments, such as the death pen-
alty, were barbarous or torturous.2 44 In some of these early decisions, the
challenged punishment was voided by the court if the term of imprison-
ment for a crime clearly exceeded the term of imprisonment for similar
offenses.245 In other decisions, the challenged punishment was voided if
no common law precedent to the punishment could be found.246
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has established no clear stan-
dard for determining whether a particular punishment or term of incar-
ceration is permissible under the Eighth Amendment.2 47 The resulting
ambiguity, however, is not unintended.2 48 The Supreme Court years ago
indicated that the Eighth Amendment "draw[s] its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety" and "that the words of the Eighth Amendment are not precise, and
... their scope is not static. '249 These Eighth Amendment principles still
hold true today250 and have been relied upon by the Supreme Court, as
well as lower courts, to acknowledge changed social values towards a
prisoner's sentencing, conditions of incarceration, and health care. 251 Re-
242. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
243. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
244. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (1976); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
245. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357, 366, 380-81 (1910) (comparing
the plaintiff public official's sentence for 15 years in chains, at hard and painful labor with-
out assistance from family or friends, for the crime of falsifying a public and official docu-
ment to sentences imposed for some other crimes, such as homicide, forgery and
embezzlement, which were not as severely punished).
246. See Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 689-90 (D. Nev. 1918); cf. Washington v. Feilen,
126 P. 75, 78 (Wash. 1912). The court in Feilen observed that some of these "barbarous"
punishments included burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, strangling to death, and
cutting off the nose, ears or limbs. See id. Nevertheless, the court also found that the por-
tion of a prisoner's sentence requiring that a vasectomy be performed upon the prisoner
was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Washington Constitution. See id. It is
interesting to note, however, that the court prefaced its finding that vasectomies were per-
missible with the observation that "modern scientific investigation shows that ... criminal-
ity [is] congenital and hereditary ... and that [t]here appears to be a wonderful unanimity
of favoring opinion as to the advisability of the sterilization of criminals and the prevention
of their further propagation." Id. at 76-77.
247. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99-100; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03.
248. See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
249. Id. at 100-01.
250. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 308 (1991)
(White, J., concurring).
251. See, e.g., Helling, 509 U.S. at 32-33.
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cent court decisions, for example, may permit prisoners to sue correc-
tional officials for housing vulnerable inmates with prisoners who are
known to sexually assault weaker cell mates, when those vulnerable in-
mates are later sexually assaulted;252 for exposing prisoners to environ-
mental ("second-hand") tobacco smoke;2 53 or for placing inmates in
medical isolation for refusing to undergo a tuberculosis test when isola-
tion results in restricted access to law libraries or other prison
programs.254
Characterizing castration as anything but punishment may be difficult
because castration of persons accused or charged with criminal conduct
has been historically intended.255 Even the U.S. Supreme Court observes
as much.256 In Weems v. United States,2 57 the Court grouped castration
together with other punishments it considered barbarous and therefore
impermissible, such as quartering and hanging in chains.258 More recent
court decisions mention castration and its pernicious application in the
first half of this century to African-American males for certain crimes. In
the Supreme Court case of Graham v. Collins,259 for instance, Justice
Thomas commented in a concurring opinion on the use of mandatory
death sentences and castration for black-but not white-men convicted
of the rape or attempted rape of white women.260 The district court in
United States v. Clary26' made a similar observation. 262 Today, it scarcely
can be argued that some measure of vengeance, tinged with outright ha-
tred, is altogether unintended by recent legislation or other public pro-
posals pertaining to sexual offenders.263 Recent controversy over the
252. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 848-49; Billman v. Indiana Dep't of Cor-
rections, 56 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 1995).
253. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 36-37.
254. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 480-82 (2d Cir. 1996); Jihad, 929 F. Supp. at 331.
255. See, e.g., Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 416 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd, 242 U.S. 468
(1917) (recalling how castration was imposed as a punishment for treason); Smith v.
Wayne, 204 N.W. 140, 148 (Mich. 1925) (Wiest, J., dissenting) (observing, while dissenting
from court ruling that sterilization of persons with mental defects was constitutionally per-
missible, that the framers of the Bill of Rights had knowledge that castration was a cruel
and unusual punishment); but see Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1977)
(remanding a lower court's dismissal of an ex-probationer's claim that his plea bargained
castration, in lieu of incarceration, was unconstitutional, but observing in remand instruc-
tions that if the California statute permitted the court to order the probationer to undergo
castration, then immunity from the probationer's constitutional claims would attach to the
court, district attorneys, and the physicians involved in the plea bargain process).
256. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
257. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
258. See id. at 377. In contrast, the concept that the death penalty might constitute cruel
and unusual punishment has yet to strike a similar resonance in Supreme Court decisions.
See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 86, 99.
259. 506 U.S. 461 (1993).
260. See id. at 482 (Thomas, J., concurring).
261. 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1182 (1995).
262. See id. at 774 (referring to a 1697 Pennsylvania law under which black men who
raped white women were subject to the death penalty, and those who were found to have
attempted the rape of white women were subject to castration).
263. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (observing that,
in passing a law regarding sex offenders, members of the New York State Legislature de-
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public notice and involuntary civil commitment required of recently re-
leased sex offenders demonstrates our profound repugnance and ambiva-
lence towards persons convicted of sexual abuse involving children. 264
Despite attempts to characterize some of this legislation as having no pu-
nitive purpose, some courts have found otherwise and have invalidated
these laws as constitutionally impermissible. 265
Aside from the U.S. Supreme Court, other courts have passed judg-
ment on castration either indirectly or directly, and none have ruled that
castration is permissible under a cruel and unusual punishment analysis.
For example, in State v. Brown,266 a case involving three offenders who
had pleaded guilty to first degree sexual conduct involving a sexual as-
sault, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that castration "is a form
of mutilation" and was therefore prohibited by that state's constitutional
provision on cruel and unusual punishment.2 67 The case reached the
South Carolina Supreme Court after the three offenders unsuccessfully
sought to compel the trial court to suspend their sentences and five years
probation, in lieu of thirty years incarceration, that the trial court judge
had conditioned upon the offenders receiving surgical castration.268 The
South Carolina Supreme Court observed that while state law provides
trial judges with certain powers to suspend sentences upon conditions
that the trial judges determine are appropriate, such discretion is not un-
limited and is restricted by public policy considerations derived by impli-
cation from the Constitution, state statutes, and judicial decisions.269 The
court found that since castration is prohibited by the state's constitution,
the trial judge's suspended sentence, conditioned upon the offenders re-
ceiving castration, was illegal and void as against public policy.270
In Davis v. Berry, a federal district court analogized the state of Iowa's
practice of performing vasectomies upon persons convicted of two or
more felonies to the historical practice of performing castrations. 271 In
scribed sex offenders as "depraved," "the lowest of the low," "animals," and "the human
equivalent of toxic waste"); see supra text accompanying note 16 (describing some of the
public response to incidents of child molestation).
264. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2071-77 (1997) (discussing Kansas's stat-
ute for involuntary civil commitment following incarceration); Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 604
(reviewing public notification); see also Matthew Purdy, "I Watch Him Like a Hawk;" Sex
Offenders are Shadowed by Wary Parole Officers, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997, at 26 (follow-
ing the work of parole officers whose caseload includes sex offenders). One officer super-
vises 25 rapists and child molesters whose misdeeds "are the kind that stir feelings of
revenge in the hearts of most people and sympathy in few;" the parole officer observes,
"[y]ou can't hate these people ... [b]ut you can't forget who they are." Id.
265. See Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 604-05; but see Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078-80 (finding
permissible under the U.S. Constitution a state's involuntary commitment scheme involv-
ing inmates deemed to have a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" and who are
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, and who are about to be released
from prison).
266. 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985).
267. Id. at 412.
268. See id. at 411.
269. See id. at 411-12.
270. See id. at 412.
271. See Davis, 216 F. at 416-17; but see Feilen, 126 P. at 78; Briley, 564 F.2d at 858.
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striking down the constitutionality of that state's vasectomy statute, the
district court observed that vasectomy and castration are essentially the
same in purpose and result-with castration being "coarser and more vul-
gar"-and that either operation would follow a man for the rest of his
life.272 The court also observed that while the physical suffering of either
operation may not be so great, physical suffering is not the only test of
cruel punishment.273 The court stated that imposing "the humiliation, the
degradation, [and] the mental suffering [of a vasectomy]" as punishment
may be just as unacceptably cruel as physical punishment.274 The idea
that castration as punishment is impermissible under the Constitution was
also noted by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Kenimer v. State.275
There, the court suggested, without actually having a particular claim in-
volving castration before it, that the Eighth Amendment was "doubtless,
intended to prohibit the barbarities of quartering, hanging in chains,
[and] castration.'276 Taken together, the U.S. Supreme Court's com-
ments, as well as lower court decisions or observations on castration,
demonstrate that-at least where imposed as punishment or provided for
as a purely penological objective-surgical castration violates constitu-
tional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.277
B. CASTRATION AS MEDICALLY ACCEPTABLE TREATMENT
It is worthwhile to note, however, that in none of the cases discussed
above was the decision or underlying reasoning based upon evidence, an
explicit awareness, or an intent that castration has a therapeutic-other
than destroying the power of procreation-rather than punitive purpose.
Had a therapeutic rather than punitive purpose for castration been estab-
lished at the time, the outcomes or judicial observations in those cases
may have been different. Even now, there are only a few studies that
involve sex offenders who have undergone surgical castration, and none
of these involve clinical investigations in the United States. The studies
that are available took place in Europe, and are considered by some re-
searchers and clinicians to be dated and not especially rigorous; 278 this
may suffice to convince some U.S. courts that castration for the purpose
of treating incarcerated pedophiles is impermissible under the Eighth
Amendment.
Whether courts would reach the same result if castration is accepted by
medical and health professionals as therapeutic for treating the sexual
disorders of incarcerated pedophiles is not certain. It is clear that merely
272. Davis, 216 F. at 416.
273. See id.
274. Id.
275. 59 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950).
276. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
277. See supra Part IV.A.
278. See Ortmann, supra note 102, at 443-45 (stating that since 1972, no sexual offender




characterizing castration as treatment is unlikely to save a statute that
authorizes such a procedure from scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment:
the U.S. Supreme Court clearly finds that the mere characterization
would not alter its effect.279 If castration were shown by U.S. medical or
health professionals to be a promising therapeutic intervention for
pedophilic sex offenders, courts might permit such a procedure, especially
given unmistakably clear legislative enactment so providing, together
with substantially heightened protection for inmates who voluntarily re-
quest castration.280 In fact, a court may even mandate treatment in lieu
of a lengthier sentence, as did the court in People v. Harris,281 when it
overturned a lower court's twenty-five-year sentence that was imposed
upon a defendant convicted of sexual assault crimes involving a seven-
year old victim. 282 The court stated that the sentence was excessive and
that the lower court abused its discretion when it stated that "little or no
treatment" was available to the defendant.283 In remanding the case back
to the lower court to balance sentencing and rehabilitation, the appellate
court took judicial notice of the fact that treatment for paraphilias, in-
cluding surgical castration, is available and successful. 284
In determining whether surgical castration is sufficiently therapeutic to
satisfy constitutional scrutiny, a court would find certain questions impor-
tant, such as whether a given procedure as novel (at least in the U.S., and
at least with respect to sex offender treatment) as surgical castration had
gone beyond an experimental stage and had become an accepted modal-
ity of treatment for sexual deviance; the risks to the inmate posed by
castration; and the nature of the inmate's consent to undergo the proce-
dure. 28 5 Several appellate and federal district courts have interpreted the
Eighth Amendment as prohibiting correctional and custodial officials
from providing medical treatment that is not a recognized and acceptable
medical practice. 286 In the often-cited case of Knecht v. Gillman,287 for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that a state
279. Trop, 356 U.S. at 95 (observing that "even a clear legislative classification of a
statute as 'non-penal' would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute").
280. See supra Part III.C.
281. 543 N.E.2d 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
282. See id. at 868.
283. Id. at 867-68.
284. See id.
285. See, e.g., Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 219-21 (D. Md. 1979).
286. See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Pena v.
New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (determining that
the use of thorazine, among other practices, was anti-therapeutic and unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind. 1972),
affid, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (deciding that intermuscular
tranquilizers must meet minimal medical standards in order to be constitutional); cf. Ren-
nie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D. N.J. 1978) (holding that use of a psychotropic drug
with side effects does not violate the Eighth Amendment because its use was part of a
treatment program rather than punishment); In re Mental Health of K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747,
751 (Okla. 1980) (determining that a legally competent adult in a mental institution could
refuse to give consent to the administration of antipsychotic drugs).
287. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
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correctional facility's use of apomorphine upon inmates as part of an
aversive therapy program was impermissible under the Eighth Amend-
ment and enjoined its further use except under narrowly drawn circum-
stances.28 8 The court relied in part upon expert testimony related to the
medical acceptability of the use of apomorphine, which indicated that,
although success rates of between twenty to fifty percent were claimed,
such use was highly questionable and did not support the drug's use. 289
After indicating that the evidence did not establish whether the in-
mates had provided informed consent to undergo apomorphine treat-
ment, the court prohibited the use of apomorphine treatment unless the
inmate's written, informed consent was obtained beforehand. 290 This
consent process required, in part, informing the inmate of the specific
nature of the treatment, "a written description of the purpose, risks and
effects of treatment, and advising the inmate of his right to terminate the
consent at any time. '291 The court also mandated that the consent in-
clude a certification by a physician that the inmate read and understood
all terms of the consent and that the inmate was mentally competent to
fully understand the consent's provisions and to give consent.292
Findings similar to those articulated by the court in Knecht have been
expressed in Mackey v. Procunier,293 another often-cited case in which a
prison treatment scheme lacked acceptance in the medical community.294
In Mackey, the use of succinycholine as part of shock therapy in a men's
prison was challenged as cruel and unusual by an inmate who had under-
gone the treatment, despite the fact that the challenging inmate had ini-
tially consented to shock therapy.295 A lower court dismissed the
inmate's claim, finding that the inmate was essentially "asking the court
to assess the propriety of a particular course of treatment," which the
court characterized as a malpractice claim for which no violation of the
inmate's civil rights could be ascertained. 296 The Ninth Circuit court re-
versed the lower court, ruling that the lower court erred in dismissing the
inmate's Eighth Amendment claim. According to records available to
the Circuit Court, succinylcholine was recommended at the time as an
adjunct to electric shock therapy and as a relaxant together with anesthe-
sia; it was also described as "breath-stopping and paralyzing. '297 Suc-
cinylcholine was not recommended for use upon fully conscious patients
because of its frightening effects.298 The Circuit Court stated that proof
of the above matters could raise "serious constitutional questions respect-
288. See id. at 1140.
289. See id. at 1138-39.
290. See id. at 1138, 1140.
291. Id. at 1140.
292. See id.
293. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
294. See id. at 877-78.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 878.
297. See id. at 877-78.
298. See id. at 878.
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
ing cruel and unusual punishment," and that, therefore, it was error for
the lower court to have dismissed the inmate's claim.2 99
Given the concerns expressed by the courts in the above cases with
respect to procedures that might be deemed to lack medical acceptance,
proponents of castration must be prepared to defend the practice by dem-
onstrating, for example, that orchiectomies are not experimental in the
treatment of sexual disorders such as pedophilia; that the risks of such a
procedure are known, minimal, and can be mitigated; that substantially
heightened precautions are taken to ensure that inmates who elect to un-
dergo surgical castration have made their decisions voluntarily and with-
out coercion; that the inmates who elect to undergo castration have
provided their informed consent; and that surgical castration is medically
acceptable to other clinicians in the community who have patients with
similar conditions. Under conditions such as these, courts may eschew
second-guessing clinicians as to the appropriateness of surgical castration
against similarly effective treatment alternatives, rendering castration
possible in narrowly drawn circumstances.
C. DENIAL OF CASTRATION As DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO A
SERIOUS MEDICAL NEED
Heretofore, the assumption has essentially been that permitting con-
victed sex offenders who have a pedophilia disorder to voluntarily un-
dergo surgical castration must be addressed as a possible infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment, which is proscribed by the Eighth Amend-
ment.3°° If the argument proceeds that surgical castration is indeed ther-
apeutic and clinically indicated for at least some offenders with a
pedophilia disorder-and that these offenders should be permitted to vol-
untarily undergo castration-then surgical castration must also be ad-
dressed as a possible infliction of cruel and unusual punishment when
castration is denied to those offenders. In this respect, the Eighth
Amendment is a double-edged sword; it is not only the measurement of
permissible punishment meted out by government, but it also prohibits
prison and other government officials from being deliberately indifferent
to prisoners' serious medical needs. 301 The dilemma for proponents of
surgical castration is that, once touted as treatment for offenders with a
pedophilia disorder, it would be somewhat disingenuous to deny castra-
tion to inmates for whom the procedure holds therapeutic promise.
The seminal case imposing an Eighth Amendment requirement upon
prison officials to provide inmates with medical care is Estelle v. Gamble.
In Estelle, a Texas state prison inmate brought a civil rights claim against
various prison officials for their failure to properly diagnose and ade-
quately treat a back injury that the inmate sustained while working at the
299. Id.
300. See supra Parts IV.A.-B.
301. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03.
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prison. 30 2 The U.S. Supreme Court began by observing that prior inter-
pretations of the Eighth Amendment establish "the government's obliga-
tion to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his
medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be
met."' 30 3 The Court proceeded to set forth the applicable test for when
the denial of medical treatment would give rise to a cognizable claim:
[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners con-
stitutes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's
needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access
to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once
prescribed. Regard[l]ess of how evidenced, deliberate indifference
to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under[section] 1983.304
Based upon this test, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the inmate did
not state a cognizable claim, given that the inmate had been seen by med-
ical personnel on seventeen occasions and that the inmate's injuries had
been treated, albeit not to the inmate's satisfaction; differences in medical
judgment as to diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment constituted at
best, the Court observed, medical malpractice and not cruel and unusual
punishment. 30 5
While the Supreme Court has never directly confronted the applicabil-
ity of the Eighth Amendment's right to treatment to mental disorders, it
is the "general consensus among the courts that there is no logical distinc-
tion between the right to medical care for physical ailments and the right
to mental health care for psychological or psychiatric impairments. '30 6
Therefore, in the context of being denied surgical castration, an inmate, in
order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim, would need to show: (1)
that the inmate suffers from a pedophilia disorder and that this consti-
tutes a "serious medical need," either in the form of a physical or psycho-
302. See id. at 98. For a summary of cases dealing with denial by prison officials of
medication, see Michael S. Vaughn, Section 1983 Civil Liability of Prison Officials for De-
nying and Delaying Medication and Drugs to Prison Inmates, 11 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 47
(1995).
303. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
304. Id. at 104-05 (citations omitted).
305. See id. at 107.
306. Connie Mayer, Survey of Case Law Establishing Constitutional Minima for the
Provision of Mental Health Services to Psychiatrically Involved Inmates, 15 NEw ENG. J.
CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 243, 244-45 (1989); see also Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030
(11th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052 (11th Cir. 1986); Partridge v. Two Un-
known Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S. Ct. 3587 (1984); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237
(9th Cir. 1982); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979);
Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977); Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with
Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILIrY L.
REP. 339, 339-40 (1992); James R. P. Ogloff et al., Mental Health Services in Jails and Pris-
ons: Legal, Clinical, and Policy Issues, 18 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 119-20 (1994).
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
logical disorder;30 7 and (2) that prison officials' failure to provide the
inmate with surgical castration evinces "deliberate indifference" to the
inmate's serious medical need. However, because the U.S. Supreme
Court in Estelle failed to give clear definitions of what the terms "serious
medical needs" and "deliberate indifference" mean, determining whether
a particular illness, injury, or method of treatment comes within the test
has only been discerned through later cases.30 8
1. Pedophilia as a Serious Medical Need
One of the earliest and most influential cases addressing mental disa-
bilities as an Eighth Amendment concern is Bowring v. Godwin;309 there,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that prison inmates are
entitled under the Eighth Amendment to
psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health
care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of obser-
vation, concludes with reasonable medical certainty (1) that the pris-
oner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such
disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3)
that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the
denial of care would be substantial. The right to treatment is, of
course, limited to that which may be provided upon a reasonable
cost and time basis and the essential test is one of medical necessity
and not simply that which may be considered merely desirable.310
The court's opinion in Bowring is consistent with other circuit courts that
have examined the general contours of what is meant by "serious medical
need." For example, the Eighth Circuit defines "serious medical need" as
"one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or
one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention. '311 The Ninth Circuit defines "serious
medical need" as "[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or
patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the
presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's
daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain .... ",312
Whatever definition is applied, whether or not pedophilia qualifies as a
serious medical need will obviously depend, in large part, on the testi-
mony of experts in the mental health profession. 313
307. See supra Parts II.A.1.-2.
308. See supra notes 301-07 and accompanying text; infra notes 309-17 and accompany-
ing text.
309. 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977).
310. Id. at 47-48.
311. MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DisTRicT COURTS OF
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 4.31 (1995); Johnson v. Busby, 953 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1991)
(adopting these jury instructions).
312. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992).
313. Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 306, at 341 (noting that while minor depression or
"behavioral and emotional problems alone do not qualify as serious mental illness, acute
depression, paranoid schizophrenia, 'nervous collapse,' and suicidal tendencies" do).
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The level of medical research and studies being conducted that seek to
find appropriate, effective treatments for pedophilia is compelling evi-
dence that, in and of itself, pedophilia disorder is a serious medical
need. 314 Additionally, a state's own actions towards sex offenders also
evidence a recognition that a pedophilia disorder is a serious medical
need. For example, many states now mandate that convicted sex offend-
ers undergo rehabilitation before they can be eligible for parole.315
Other states, concerned that a released pedophile will again act out his or
her sexual desires despite the threat of prison or the revocation of proba-
tion, have enacted statutes providing for the involuntary civil commit-
ment of certain inmates at the conclusion of their prison sentence. 316
Still other states have developed sexual offender counseling and treat-
ment programs within their prisons.317 Thus, if a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist diagnoses an inmate's pedophilia as a physical or mental dis-
order based on some acceptable diagnostic tool and categorizes that dis-
order as serious, the first prong under Estelle v. Gamble has been
satisfied. Of course, simply classifying pedophilia as a serious medical
need, however, does not entitle an inmate to his requested orchiectomy;
the second prong of the Estelle test, deliberate indifference, must also be
satisfied.
2. Deliberate Indifference
The deliberate indifference standard under the Eighth Amendment is
met when an act or failure to act "entails something more than mere neg-
ligence,... [but] something less than acts or omissions for the very pur-
314. See supra Parts II.A.-B.
315. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.067 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11.7-105 (West 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-606.3 (Michie 1995 & Supp.
1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 439.340, 532.045 (Banks-Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1996); LA.
REV. STAT. Ar. § 14:81.2 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.140 (West
1996 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 991(a) (West 1995); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-706 (1996).
316. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 et seq. (West 1995 & Supp. 1997). In the Bill
that enacted the 1995 amendments to provide for the commitment of sexually violent
predators, the legislature made the following findings:
The Legislature finds and declares that a small but extremely dangerous
group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders
can be identified while they are incarcerated. . . . The Legislature further
finds and declares that while these individuals have been duly punished for
their criminal acts, they are, if adjudicated sexually violent predators, a con-
tinuing threat to society. The continuing danger posed by these individuals
and the continuing basis for their judicial commitment is a currently diag-
nosed mental disorder which predisposes them to engage in sexually violent
criminal behavior. It is the intent of the Legislature that these individuals be
committed and treated for their disorders only as long as the disorders persist
and not for any punitive purposes.
Id.; see also S.B. 3, 76th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1995); H.B. 406, 1996 Reg. Sess. (Ky.
1996); S.B. 2040, 54th Leg. (N.D. 1995); S.B. 5088, 54th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995).
317. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-29-406 (Michie 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5210 (1995
& Supp. 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.400 et seq. (Banks-Baldwin 1995); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 217.139 (West 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-306 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
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pose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result. ' 318 The
deliberate indifference standard has been applied not only to medical
treatment cases, but also to cases involving the conditions of an inmate's
confinement. 319 It is in the context of inmate complaints over prison con-
ditions that the Supreme Court has most recently elaborated on what
constitutes deliberate indifference for the purpose of establishing an
Eighth Amendment violation.
For example, in the case of Farmer v. Brennan,320 a preoperative
transsexual inmate claimed that prison officials had demonstrated delib-
erate indifference by failing to keep the inmate from harm allegedly in-
flicted by other prisoners.321 The inmate, who had spent time in both
administrative segregation and in the prison's general population,
claimed that prison officials deliberately placed him in the general popu-
lation despite the officials having knowledge that the prison had a history
of inmate assaults, that the inmate with whom the transsexual inmate had
been housed was known to have sexually assaulted other vulnerable in-
mates, and that the transsexual inmate, in particular, was vulnerable to
sexual assault and would in fact be sexually assaulted by his cell-mate. 322
The Supreme Court first observed that recklessly disregarding a substan-
tial risk of serious harm to a prisoner was tantamount to deliberate indif-
ference under the Eighth Amendment. 323 A finding of recklessness for
Eighth Amendment liability requires that the prison official "know[ ] of
and. disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; [that] the
official . . .be [both] aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [that the official]
draw [that] inference. '324 The Supreme Court found that the district
court below had entered judgment for the prison officials based upon a
standard that was inconsistent with the standard enunciated by the Court,
and remanded the case to the court below to determine-consistent with
the Court's new standard-whether deliberate indifference had
occurred. 325
In order to establish deliberate indifference based upon Farmer, an in-
mate must show that prison officials: (1) were aware of the inmate's seri-
ous medical need, from which it could be inferred that medical attention
was warranted and that the failure to receive medical treatment posed a
substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) disregarded, ignored, or refused
to provide the inmate with treatment for that serious medical need.
326
318. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
319. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (holding that prisoners claiming that
conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment were required to
show deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials).
320. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
321. See id. at 830.
322. See id. at 831.
323. See id. at 836.
324. Id. at 837.
325. See id. at 849.
326. See id. at 837.
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Courts have found deliberate indifference in medical cases where, for ex-
ample, the prison's medical staff or facilities are deficient; prison officials
prevent inmates from receiving prescribed treatment; inmates are denied
access to medical personnel for the purpose of evaluating the inmates'
need for treatment; and prison officials cause unreasonable delays in pro-
viding medical services. 327
While no cases thus far have challenged the refusal of surgical castra-
tion on Eighth Amendment grounds, some cases are sufficiently analo-
gous to be instructive. For example, in Supre v. Ricketts,328 a transsexual
inmate brought suit against prison officials alleging that his Eighth
Amendment rights were violated when prison officials refused to provide
him with the female hormone estrogen.32 9 The Tenth Circuit found that
some treatment was required for the inmate. However, there were a vari-
ety of options available, and the inmate was unable to show that the fail-
ure to treat him with estrogen-which the record indicated was a
controversial therapy-would constitute deliberate indifference to his se-
rious medical need.330 Other courts have held similarly; while transsexu-
alism is a serious medical need, inmates do not have a right under the
Eighth Amendment to a particular type of treatment, so long as some
other treatment option is made available to them.331
In contrast, in the case of Woodall v. Foti,332 an inmate brought suit
against the sheriff in charge of the prison, claiming that his incarceration
was a result of engaging in deviant sexual behavior; that the prison psy-
chiatrist had advised the inmate that the inmate required psychiatric
counseling; that the inmate had requested such counseling; and that the
request for specialized treatment was refused by the sheriff in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.333 Allegedly, the prison psychiatrist could not
provide the type of counseling necessary to treat the inmate's pedophilia
because the psychiatrist was not qualified to administer psychotherapy,
and, moreover, the psychiatrist's heavy case load prevented him from
327. See Mayer, supra note 284, at 246; but see Vaughn, supra note 280, at 62, 69-73(stating that there is no deliberate indifference, hence no liability, in cases involving the
delay or denial of medication where the delay is not life-threatening, or where the delay
does not pose long-term deleterious effects, or where a medical practitioner has not pre-
scribed a medication).
328. 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986).
329. See id. at 960.
330. See id. at 963.
331. See Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
935 (1987); see also Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (no denial
of medical care where denial of conjugated estrogen was the result of informed medical
opinion); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988) (transsexualism is a serious
medical need); Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792, 800-01 (W.D. Mich.
1990), affd, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991) (transsexualism is a serious medical need and the
inmate was entitled to preliminary injunction to receive estrogen therapy); Long v. Nix,
877 F. Supp. 1358, 1365 (S.D. Iowa 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 761, (8th Cir. 1996) (transsexuals
have the right to treatment, but not to any particular type of treatment); Brown v. Zavaras,
63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995) (transsexual has a general right to medical treatment for
gender dysphoria).
332. 648 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. June 1981) (5th Cir. split in 1981).
333. See id. at 270-71.
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rendering effective medical assistance. 334
The lower court dismissed the inmate's action for failure to state a cog-
nizable claim under section 1983.335 Upon appeal, the Fifth Circuit va-
cated the lower court's order, finding that the inmate's allegations, taken
as true, could in fact entitle him to relief.336 The Fifth Circuit set out the
competing considerations a court should take into account when deciding
whether the denial of the psychiatric treatment amounts to deliberate in-
difference to the inmate's serious medical needs:
On the one hand, it should consider the seriousness of the prisoner's
illness, the need for immediate treatment, the likely duration of his
incarceration, the possibility of substantial harm caused by post-
poned treatment, the prospects of some cure or substantial improve-
ment in his condition, and the extent to which the prisoner presents a
risk of danger to himself or other inmates. On the other hand, the
court should consider the availability and expense of providing psy-
chiatric treatment and the effect of such unusual care on ordinary jail
administration.337
The court observed that when assessing the merits of an inmate's Eighth
Amendment claim, the "essential test is one of medical necessity and not
one simply of desirability. '338
While the number of cases involving sex offenders' Eighth Amendment
claims is limited, the courts with rare exception have consistently denied
the inmates' claims, either holding that: (1) the inmate, despite showing
that he has been convicted of a sexual offense, did not show that he had a
serious medical need;339 or that (2) although the inmate's sexual disorder
did constitute a serious medical need, the treatment provided at the
prison was sufficient, and therefore did not merit a finding of deliberate
indifference. 340 Cases such as these reflect the maxim among courts that
some treatment, but not necessarily every or even the best available treat-
334. See id.
335. See id. at 270.
336. See id. at 272.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1996) (mere allega-
tions by inmates that they had serious mental disorders are insufficient to constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation, absent a diagnosis by a physician or a condition that a lay-
person would easily recognize as requiring attention); State v. Drennen, 842 P.2d 698, 702
(Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (diagnosis of a sexual disorder, including a recommended inpatient
treatment, is insufficient to establish a serious medical need that will not be met while in
confinement); Patterson v. Webster, 760 F. Supp. 150, 154 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (sex offenders
do not have a serious medical need for sex offender treatment, even where required to be
eligible for parole); Ramos v. Vaughn, No. CIV.A.94-2596, 1995 WL 386573, at *5-6 (E.D.
Pa. June 27, 1995) (inmate's alleged need for sex offender treatment does not constitute a
serious medical need for Eighth Amendment purposes).
340. See, e.g., Stillwell v. State, 859 P.2d 964, 968 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied,
511 U S. 1056 (incarceration without psychological or psychiatric treatment for sex offend-
ers is not violative of the Eighth Amendment); Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1155
(8th Cir. 1991) (absence of treatment programs specifically directed toward psychopathic
individuals who have committed sexual offenses, without evidence of cure or generally
accepted method of treatment, does not constitute deliberate indifference).
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ment, should be provided to inmates. "Amid the ambiguity regarding
what prison health care must include, courts and commentators have
made clear that inmates have no right to perfect or optimal health care
... [n]or... to absolutely every potentially beneficial medical procedure,
regardless of how rare or experimental. '341
The same maxim will apply to inmates with pedophilia disorders who
demand surgical castration under the Eighth Amendment; courts will re-
quire evidence, based on expert testimony, that the inmate's pedophilia
constitutes a serious medical need, and that prison officials are aware of
this medical need but nevertheless refuse to provide castration. Prison
officials will be required to demonstrate that pedophilia disorders do not
constitute a serious medical need; that even if pedophilia is a serious
medical need, the inmate is not entitled to castration because other treat-
ment is being provided; or that the failure to provide castration did not
amount to deliberate indifference.
At present, even if pedophilia is considered a serious medical need,
surgical castration has not yet been shown to have acquired medical ac-
ceptance among medical and health professionals as a treatment for that
disorder. 342 Additionally, courts dealing with incarcerated pedophiles
who seek treatment are reticent to provide even minimal levels of psychi-
atric and psychological counseling, and may therefore be quite unwilling
to require a treatment that is still a matter of some debate.343 Nonethe-
less, it is almost a certainty that if surgical castration acquires medical
acceptance as a treatment for pedophilic disorders, an inmate who re-
quests and is denied such a procedure has a strong Eighth Amendment
claim. Given the Eighth Amendment's "evolving standards of de-
cency" 344 and the recognition that inmates with paraphilic disabilities
such as pedophilia are in need of treatment, such a claim could one day
prevail.
V. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
Apart from Eighth Amendment concerns, there may also be Due Pro-
cess considerations associated with the issue of inmates undergoing surgi-
cal castration as treatment for their pedophilia disorders. Despite
incarceration, "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protec-
tions when he is imprisoned for crime. '345 Inmates have been found by
341. Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of
Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV.
921, 933-34 (1992).
342. But see supra Part II.B.2.c.
343. See generally Daniel L. Icenogle, Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Bio-
logical Treatments: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 279, 280 (1994).
344. See supra Part IV.A.
345. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (observing that constitutional
guarantees such as prisoners' religious freedoms, access to courts, equal protection, and
Due Process rights may not be deprived); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 132-37 (1992)
(declaring that prisoners have a constitutional liberty interest in avoiding forced medica-
tion, and that forced medication may implicate an inmate's right to a full and fair trial);
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the U.S. Supreme Court to enjoy First Amendment religious freedoms,
Sixth Amendment right of access to courts, and other constitutional privi-
leges that free-world persons enjoy,346 although for inmates such rights
may be "diminished" by the "needs and exigencies" of the prison envi-
ronment. 347 In addition, inmates" substantive federal constitutional rights
or other liberties provided by federal or state law are protected under the
Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, which essentially state that no person
shall be deprived of these liberties without Due Process of law.348 This
Due Process protection has both substantive and procedural compo-
nents.349 The substantive component is determined by the particular con:-
stitutional liberty interest at stake, which is balanced against opposing
state interests. 350 The procedural component "concerns the minimum
procedures required by the [U.S.] Constitution for determining that the
individual's liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular in-
stance."' 351 In other words, the state's deprivation of a substantive Due
Process liberty interest is not by itself impermissible; what is impermissi-
ble is the deprivation of such a protected liberty interest without Due
Process.352 Although at first glance Due Process considerations might
not find much resonance in the context of inmate medical claims regard-
ing a program of voluntary surgical castration, an examination of such a
treatment scheme without taking such considerations into account is
incomplete.
A. INMATES' SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LIBERTY INTERESTS
For our purposes, the substantive Due Process issue is first framed by
inquiring whether a person with a pedophilia disorder has a protected
liberty interest in: (a) obtaining a surgical castration as treatment; or (b)
avoiding surgical castration without informed consent or the procedural
safeguards commensurate with involuntary treatment. Since the question
involves offenders with a medical claim, the first inquiry is properly an
Eighth Amendment rather than a substantive Due Process issue.353 And
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96-99 (1987)
(finding prisoner's right to marry protected under the constitution); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (stating that prison inmates may not be subjected to deliberate indif-
ference to their serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment); but cf Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (finding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation
of privacy from search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
346. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56.
347. Id. at 555.
348. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, sect. 1.
349. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 220. The Due Process Clause is sometimes said to be
comprised of three components: the specific protections found in the Bill of Rights; the
substantive component that prohibits arbitrary and wrongful government actions "regard-
less of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them;" and the guarantee of fair
procedure. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (citation omitted).
350. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 220.
351. Id. (citing Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982)).
352. See id. at 125-26.
353. See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03 (establishing firmly for the first time in
Supreme Court jurisprudence the principle that the government has an "obligation to pro-
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as the question of whether inmates with pedophilic disorders have a right
to surgical orchiectomy protected by the Eighth Amendment has already
been discussed in the previous section, no further deliberation on that
issue is required here. 354
The second substantive Due Process inquiry-whether an inmate has a
protected liberty interest in avoiding surgical castration in the absence of
informed consent or the procedural safeguards commensurate with invol-
untary treatment-can be answered by reference to the two Supreme
Court cases invoking Due Process protection where inmates were subject
to involuntary medication with anti-psychotic drugs, Washington v.
Harper355 and Riggins v. Nevada.356 In Harper, the Court stated quite
strongly that the respondent-prisoner has a significant liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that forcing anti-
psychotic drugs upon an unconsenting prisoner is impermissible absent a
finding of a state's overriding justification as well as the medical appropri-
vide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration," and that deliberate
indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs constitutes the "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain" in violation of the Eighth Amendment) (citations omitted).
The leading U.S. Supreme Court case establishing the standard of review for inmate
constitutional substantive Due Process non-medical claims is Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78(1987). In Turner, the Supreme Court reviewed a lower court's decision that found prison
regulations prohibiting or limiting inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence
unconstitutional. See id. The Court said that two principles guide the consideration of
inmates' constitutional claims: one is that federal courts must take cognizance of the valid
constitutional claims of prison inmates. Id. at 84 (citation omitted). The Court noted that
"(p)rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protection of the
Constitution." Id. The other principle is that "courts are ill-equipped to deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform." Id. (citation omitted).
As a general rule, prison officials are accorded considerable deference in "[r]unning a
prison." Id. at 84-85. The Court then indicated that its decisions will be responsive to both
principles in establishing a standard of review for inmates' constitutional claims. Id. at 84.
In Turner, the Court was careful to announce the proper standard of review for prisoners'
constitutional claims unlike previous Court decisions: "[w]hen a prison regulation impinges
on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests." Id. at 89; see id. at 85-89 (discussing prior Court decisions).
This reasonableness standard applies whether or not the claimed constitutional right is
fundamental, and applies even where the state would otherwise be required to satisfy a
more rigorous standard of review. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citation omitted). The
Turner reasonableness standard is comprised of several factors relevant to determining a
prison regulation's reasonableness: first, whether there was a valid, rational connection
between the prison regulation and a legitimate, neutral governmental interest that justifies
the regulation; second, whether alternative means of exercising the claimed right remain
open to prison inmates; third, the impact that accommodation of the claimed right would
have upon guards and other inmates, and upon the allocation of prison resources generally;
and fourth, the absence of obvious and easy alternatives to the challenged regulation. See
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 90.
354. See supra Part IV (arguing that inmates with pedophilic disorders are unlikely to
succeed on a claim that the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to make surgical
castration available on demand, absent a clear showing that, first, pedophilia is a serious
medical need and that, second, refusing inmates surgical castration treatment evinces delib-
erate indifference to that medical need).
355. 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (involving an prison inmate in Washington state).
356. 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (involving a pretrial detainee).
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ateness of the treatment.357 In Riggins, the Court observed that other
courts have recognized a protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
medication, and in referring to the Harper case, stated that pretrial de-
tainees "retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are
enjoyed by convicted prisoners. '358 An important factor in these deci-
sions was the recognition that the purpose of the anti-psychotic medica-
tions at issue was to alter the chemical balances in a patient's brain,
leading to changes in the patient's cognitive processes, and the recogni-
tion that such drugs may have serious and even fatal side effects.
359
In the Harper and Riggins cases, weighing against the inmates' substan-
tive Due Process liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medications are
the states' interests in preventing harm to the inmate or to others if the
inmate were left untreated,360 and in Riggins, the additional state interest
in bringing the inmate to trial.361 In Harper, the Court held that the
state's interest-which the Court found was clearly articulated by the
state and limited by well-established procedural mechanisms that in-
cluded, along with notice and the right to be present at hearing, a finding
of mental disorder as well as dangerousness, committee review as well as
change of the type and dosage of medication, and impartial decision-mak-
ers-sufficiently accommodated the inmate's liberty interest to survive
the inmates' Due Process challenge. 362 In contrast, having failed to ac-
knowledge the inmate's liberty interest or demonstrate the contravening
state interest in forcibly medicating the inmate, the Court in Riggins con-
cluded that it was error for the lower court to order the inmate's involun-
tary treatment.363 Despite their different outcomes, both Harper and
Riggins unambiguously support the proposition that inmates do have a
substantive Due Process liberty interest in determining what may or may
not be done to their bodies, even if the proposed medical treatment is
involuntary and the failure to treat the inmate represents a threat of harm
to the inmate or to others.364 There is no plausible reason to suggest or
believe that surgical castration eludes this protection.
In contrast, the procedural Due Process inquiry has less in the way of
settled jurisprudence to guide it. As with any procedural Due Process
analysis, this inquiry rests on two assumptions. The first assumption is
that surgical castration represents a government deprivation of an in-
357. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22, 227 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316
(1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979)) (emphasis added). The notion of con-
trolling one's own body is long established. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (stating that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body") (Cardozo, J.).
358. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
359. See id. at 134. The Court went as far as observing that the medications might even
impair the inmate's right to obtain a fair trial since the inmate's demeanor might be af-
fected. See id. at 136.
360. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
361. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136.
362. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 232-36.
363. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138.
364. See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
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mate's protected substantive Due Process liberty interest, which we now
know to be the inmate's bodily integrity, regardless of the inmate's con-
sent. The second assumption is that such a deprivation is impermissible
absent a procedural undertaking that ensures that the deprivation is not
arbitrary or unfair.365 An analysis of the few relevant cases provides
some indication of whether and what procedural process is due an inmate
before surgical castration may be performed.
B. INMATES' PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
The procedural Due Process protection afforded to inmates was firmly
acknowledged in Wolff v. McDonnell.366 In Wolff, the Supreme Court
was asked to decide whether the revocation of "good time" credits
earned by an inmate was impermissible absent a full Due Process pro-
ceeding that included, among other elements, an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses as well as a right to retained or appointed
counsel.3 67 In determining the extent of the procedural protections due
an inmate, the Court observed that "one cannot automatically apply pro-
cedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society ... to the very
different situation presented ... in a state prison. '368 In rejecting the
inmates' claim for full Due Process proceedings in favor of partial Due
Process proceedings that included written notice, right to call witnesses
and present evidence, and an impartial hearing committee, the Court
found what it termed a "reasonable accommodation between the inter-
ests of the inmates and the needs of the [prison] institution. '369
The U.S. Supreme Court's latest iteration of an inmate's procedural
Due Process right is found in Sandin v. Conner,370 a case in which a
prison inmate challenged a prison policy under which the inmate was
placed in disciplinary segregation while appealing a misconduct find-
ing.37 1 In relevant part, the inmate in Sandin relied on post-Wolff cases to
argue that disciplinary segregation was such a departure from the basic
and expected conditions of confinement that Due Process proceedings
were required before such segregation could be effected.372 In rejecting
the inmate's claim, the Court took pains to emphasize Wolff as the stan-
dard against which inmate procedural Due Process claims are mea-
sured, 373 but stated that "segregated confinement did not present the
365. See, e.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 221 (commenting that the forcible medication of a
non-consenting inmate is a substantial interference with the inmate's liberty interest).
366. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
367. See id. at 544, 553.
368. Id. at 560.
369. Id. at 572; see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (stating that "[m]uch of
Wolff s contribution to the landscape of prisoners' Due Process derived not from its de-
scription of liberty interests, but rather from its intricate balancing of prison management
concerns with prisoners' liberty in determining the amount of process due").
370. See Sandlin, 515 U.S. at 472.
371. See id.
372. See id. at 485 (citation omitted).
373. See id. at 484.
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type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably
create a liberty interest. '374 In so doing, the Court found that disciplinary
segregation was less a deprivation than that posed by the revocation of
"good time" credits at issue in Wolff, and held that partial Due Process
proceedings of the type required by the Court in Wolff were not re-
quired.375 Together, Wolff and, Sandin suggest that inmate substantive
liberty interests are protected by procedural Due Process-though not
necessarily and perhaps not even. likely full procedural Due Process-and
that for deprivations that are neither atypical or significant, no procedural
Due Process protection whatsoever. Assuming what is known about sur-
gical castration as a treatment response to pedophilia disorders,376 it is
entirely plausible that a court may characterize a state's assent to perform
the procedure, as well as an inmate's request to undergo it, as a poten-
tially atypical and significant deprivation of an inmate's substantive Due
Process liberty interest. For this reason, such an event must be attended
by an appropriate level of procedural protection.
C. MEDICAL TREATMENT AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Although instructive, neither Wolff nor Sandin directly address the is-
sue of what process is due with respect to inmate claims that pertain to
medical treatment. Both cases are confined to what are essentially claims
over additional state-imposed confinement, matters that are closely re-
lated to the incidents of incarceration. Despite this fact, the Court in
Sandin recognizes that, "independent of any state regulation," an inmate
may also have a liberty interest conferred directly by the Due Process
Clause itself.377 One of the cases cited in Sandin for that very proposi-
tion, Washington v. Harper,378 is perhaps the most influential case with
respect to Due Process requirements in medical treatment cases involving
prison inmates.379
In Harper, the Supreme Court reviewed a severely mentally disordered
inmate's claim that the failure of prison officials to provide the inmate
with a judicial hearing prior to involuntarily medicating the inmate with
anti-psychotic medications was constitutionally impermissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.380 Under prison regula-
tions that existed at the time, a non-consenting inmate could not be invol-
374. Id. at 485.
375. See id. at 485-86.
376. See supra Part II.2.c.
377. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 479 n.4.
378. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). For inmates who are not sentenced but who are detained for
trial, the same Due Process protection established in Harper applies. Riggins, 504 U.S. at
135. The Supreme Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "affords at least as much
protection to persons the State detains for trial[ ]" as it affords to sentenced inmates. Id.
Here, however, prison officials failed to make a finding of a need to involuntarily medicate
the inmate during the inmate's trial, and may have thereby denied the inmate a full and
fair trial in violation of the inmate's substantive Due Process rights. See id. at 136.
379. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 479 n.4.
380. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.
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untarily medicated with anti-psychotic drugs unless both: (1) the inmate
suffers from a "mental disorder;" and (2) the inmate is "gravely disabled"
or posed a "likelihood of serious harm to himself, others, or their prop-
erty. '381 Any inmate who refuses to take the anti-psychotic medication is
entitled to a hearing before a committee consisting of a non-treating psy-
chiatrist, a psychologist, and the Associate Superintendent of the treat-
ment center for inmates with severe mental disorders. 382
A number of procedural rights are accorded the inmate before, during,
and after the hearing, including, in part, twenty-four hour notice of the
prison official's intent to convene a hearing (during which time the in-
mate may not be medicated); notice of the factual basis for his or her
diagnosis and the need for medication; the right to attend the hearing; to
present evidence; to cross-examine staff witnesses; the assistance of a lay
advisor; a right of appeal; and a right of review in a state court. 383 If a
majority of the committee agrees that the inmate has a mental disorder
and is gravely disabled or dangerous, then the inmate may be involunta-
rily medicated.384
In Harper, the Court acknowledged that prison inmates have-both by
operation of the state prison policy and by the Fourteenth Amendment-
a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of anti-psychotic
medications.385 However, the Court found that the state's administrative
scheme for safeguarding the inmate's liberty interest met the demands of
the Due Process Clause without the need for a judicial hearing.386 The
Court observed that the inmate's interests are perhaps better served by
having the decision to medicate be made by medical professionals rather
than judges, and rejected the idea that the "shortcomings of [medical]
specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision ... to an un-
trained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hear-
ing."' 387 Furthermore, the Court was satisfied with the independence of
the decision-maker in such hearings, noting that there was no indication
that institutional biases would affect or alter the decision to forcibly medi-
cate an inmate.388 Finally, the Court remarked that the practical effect of
requiring outside decision makers may be "chimerical" because outside
decision makers concur in most cases anyway. 389 Because the Court
found that the prison regulations sufficiently safeguarded the inmate's
liberty interests without the need for a judicial hearing, the lower court's
finding was reversed. 390
381. Id. at 215.
382. See id.
383. See id. at 215-16.
384. See id.
385. See id. at 221-22.
386. See id. at 229-34.
387. Id. at 232.
388. See id. at 233.
389. See id. at 235.
390. See id. at 236.
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With respect to voluntary treatment, the case of Zinermon v. Burch 391
appears particularly instructive. 392 In Zinermon, the Supreme Court
found constitutionally defective a hospital's acceptance of a voluntary pa-
tient admission. 393 In that case, a patient was voluntarily admitted to a
state mental hospital while suffering from a psychotic disorder, after the
patient had been found bruised, bloodied, hurt and disoriented and wan-
dering along a Florida highway.394 Various hospital records indicated
that the patient was at times hallucinating, confused, and psychotic, and
that on at least two occasions, the patient believed he was "in heaven. '3 95
At no point during his five-month hospitalization was a hearing held re-
garding the patient's hospitalization and treatment.396 Subsequent to his
release, the patient sued the hospital, claiming deprivation of his liberty
391. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
392. Another interesting but somewhat less relevant (and unreported) case is
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 101 (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County, July 31, 1973) (reported in full in ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902-24 (1974)). Despite being unreported, Kaimowitz
has been widely discussed. See BROOKS, supra at 904 (commenting on the publicity); id. at
924 (stating that the case has been extensively explored, and providing relevant citations).
In Kaimowitz, the court was asked to issue a declaratory judgment involving the case of
"John Doe," a patient involuntarily housed in a Michigan state hospital as a "criminal
sexual psychopath" following charges of murder and rape of a student nurse. See id. at
902-03, 905. John Doe was selected as a research subject to undergo what was considered
an experimental and innovative surgical procedure that involved the placement of electri-
cal wires into John Doe's brain, through which weak electrical currents would be passed to
determine if one or more areas of the brain trigger aggressive or violent sexual episodes.
See id. at 903. The established therapies at the time, temporal lobectomy or other neuro-
logical surgical procedures, were not involved. See id. at 906. When word of the experi-
ment became known, the declaratory suit was filed. See id. at 904.
The issue the court framed was whether an adult or legally appointed guardian may
if the adult is involuntarily detained, at a facility within the jurisdiction of the
State Department of Mental Health give legally adequate consent to an inno-
vative or experimental surgical procedure on the brain, if there is demonstra-
ble physical abnormality of the brain, and the procedure is designed to
ameliorate behavior, which is either personally tormenting to the patient, or
so profoundly disruptive that the patient cannot safely live, or live with
others....
Id. at 905. The court concluded no, but with the proviso that, when the state of medical
knowledge develops to such a degree that the procedure becomes medically acceptable,
and is no longer experimental, "it is possible, with appropriate review mechanisms," that a
patient such as John Doe could consent to the procedure. Id. at 920. The court stated
specifically that an involuntarily detained mental patient could give legally adequate con-
sent to accepted neurological procedures. See id.
The implications of a case like Kaimowitz to surgical castration of prisons with
pedophilia disorders appear obvious: the consent to surgical castration of involuntarily
confined mental patients who are deemed criminal sexual psychopaths is ineffective if sur-
gical castration is characterized as experimental. However, if surgical castration is consid-
ered medically acceptable, the informed consent of an individual, competent or otherwise
at the time the decision is made, is legally adequate. Nonetheless, this Article only sug-
gests that inmates who are deemed competent should be afforded the opportunity to vol-
untarily request surgical castration.
393. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 131, 139.
394. See id. at 118.
395. See id. at 118-19.
396. See id. at 120.
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without Due Process.397 The patient claimed that the hospital knew or
should have known that the patient was not competent to give informed
consent to his admission, and that the hospital should have instead sought
to have the patient involuntarily admitted, under which pre-deprivation
procedural safeguards exist.398
The Court agreed with the patient, finding "foreseeable that a person
needing mental health care will be unable to understand any proffered
'explanation and disclosure of the subject matter' of the forms that per-
son is asked to sign, and will be unable 'to make a knowing and willful
decision' whether to consent to admission. ' 399 The Court stated that
even if the state might be justified in taking at face value a person's vol-
untary request for admission, the state may not be justified in doing so
without further inquiry as to the person's request for treatment and ad-
mission.4°° In finding for the patient, the Court carefully reviewed the
type of procedural protections due in particular circumstances that were
established in other Due Process cases, and weighed the arguments favor-
ing either pre- or post-deprivation hearings. 401 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court was firm in rejecting the state's argument that a post-depriva-
tion hearing would have satisfied the patient's Due Process liberty inter-
est,40 2 indicating that the state is in a position to provide a pre-
deprivation process, and because a post-deprivation hearing will not be of
any use in preventing the kind of deprivation alleged.40 3
What Zinermon does is to equate-at least where persons with mental
disorders are concerned-the requirements for voluntary treatment with
requirements for involuntary treatment, necessitating more formal deter-
minations of a mentally disordered person's competency to provide in-
formed consent before the requested treatment is provided.404 Such
determinations include, in part, a medical finding, confirmed by at least
one other medical professional, that a patient meets the criteria for the
proposed treatment; a right to notice about the proposed treatment; a
judicial hearing; appointed counsel; access to medical records and person-
nel; and an independent expert examination. 40 5 Interestingly, the move
towards more formal determinations in Zinermon contrasts with the
move away from such determinations for mentally disordered prisoners
that is observed in the cases of Harper and Riggins.
Cases such as Zinermon, Harper and Riggins are instructive because
they indicate, as a threshold matter, that inmates are clearly protected by
397. See id. at 114-15.
398. See id. at 115.
399. Id. at 133.
400. See id.
401. See id. at 127-38 (citations omitted).
402. See id. at 136, 138-39 (citations omitted).
403. Id.
404. See Bruce J. Winnick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JU-
RISPRUDENCE 83, 93-94 (1991).
405. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 123-24.
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procedural Due Process. For our purposes, the cases suggest that,
whether or not surgical castration is undertaken voluntarily, such a proce-
dure could under some circumstances evince a government deprivation of
an inmate's protected liberty interest. Most important, the cases indicate
that so long as pre-deprivation procedures are sufficiently adequate to
guard against arbitrary or unfair government action, surgical castration
would not conflict with the procedural Due Process rights of inmates.
Giving due regard to the diverse findings of the relevant cases may also
require that inmates who voluntarily request surgical castration, but
whose capacity to provide informed consent is questionable, not be pro-
vided with surgical castration unless preceded by a judicial hearing before
the requested medical treatment is provided. Although this does not im-
ply that persons with pedophilia disorders are, simply because of their
pedophilia disorder, mentally disordered, paraphilias such as pedophilia
may be interpreted to impair an afflicted person's capacity to provide in-
formed consent to treatment.
Under any circumstance, it is clear that surgical castration should be
preceded by a minimum level of procedural protection, which should in-
clude, in part, restricting the procedure to inmates who are competent to
make their own medical treatment decisions; clear eligibility criteria such
as medical appropriateness; assurances that consent is indeed informed,
such as providing full information regarding the procedure and any alter-
native treatment, and written consent; and outside, professional review of
the inmate's request to undergo castration. 406 It is only through such pre-
deprivation proceedings that surgical castration can be considered legally
defensible under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that pedophilic sex offenders pose a grave risk to the
health and safety of many of the most vulnerable members of society:
children. The effects of sexual abuse inflict lifelong physical and psycho-
logical damage to children and may even predispose such victims as ado-
lescents or adults to, in turn, sexually abuse children themselves.
Preventing pedophilic sex offending is therefore an important social and
criminological objective.
Research clearly demonstrates that pedophilic behavior may be effec-
tively suppressed through a number of treatment regimes that reduce
male testosterone levels or reduces the motivation to engage in deviant
sexual conduct involving child victims. Given the consequences of
pedophilic sex offending and the ability to treat such conditions, permit-
ting convicted pedophile sex offenders to voluntarily undergo any one or
a combination of these treatments-including surgical castration-ap-
406. See supra Part 1II.D. for a more complete listing of what elements might be in-




pears quite reasonable. Some jurisdictions, including California, Mon-
tana, Florida, and Texas, have already enacted laws that provide for, or at
least sanction, surgical castration as a meaningful response to sexual dis-
orders that result in offenses involving child victims.
However, permitting convicted sex offenders to voluntarily undergo
surgical castration, ostensibly as one of a number of treatment alterna-
tives, raises important legal considerations, essentially because surgical
castration has a dubious and pernicious history, and because surgical cas-
tration has yet to find substantial support in the United States as an alter-
native treatment among those who treat sex offenders. The strongest
legal challenge to laws that provide for surgical castration of sex offenders
whose victims are children is likely to rest upon the Eighth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.
But, as our analysis indicates, permitting incarcerated sex offenders
who have a pedophilic sexual disorder to voluntarily request surgical cas-
tration within a carefully regulated therapeutic context, accompanied by
heightened precautions that bar any penological considerations, does not
infringe on an inmate's right against cruel and unusual punishment, and
might even be required if an inmate demonstrates that such treatment is
manifestly appropriate for a serious medical need.
Additional legal challenges may arise as Due Process claims under the
Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, which protect inmates from impermis-
sible deprivations of their liberty interests with regard to informed con-
sent and bodily integrity. In order to withstand such a challenge, it is
evident that surgical castration must be preceded by a minimum level of
procedural protections, which should include an inmate's competency to
make treatment decisions; the inmate's informed consent to undergo sur-
gical castration; that the castration be a clinically appropriate response to
the particular inmate's physical and psychological condition; and that the
inmate's request for castration be subject to outside professional review.
With these assurances, surgical castration may be characterized as legally
and morally defensible, as well as an appropriate response, to pedophilia
disorders among inmates.
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